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The objective of this work is to enhance the state estimator software application in 
the energy management system. The state estimator is responsible for processing raw 
power system measurements received from substation equipment in the field and filtering 
out the errors to determine the most likely state of the power system in terms of bus 
voltage magnitudes and angles. Because the state estimator solution serves as the input to 
other critical downstream applications in the energy management system, such as 
contingency analysis and optimal power flow, it is key that a unique solution can be 
found, and that the solution is accurate.  
The changing nature of the power grid is introducing new challenges for the state 
estimator. The first challenge is the need to process more data in less time. New sensors 
such as phasor measurement units that have a finer sampling granularity are creating 
more data for the state estimator to process. Market deregulation has created the need to 
monitor larger interconnections. Also, faster system dynamics due to the integration of 
non-dispatchable renewables such as wind and solar are creating a need for faster state 
estimation, so that power system operators have a clearer understanding of the time-
varying system behavior. With all of these new driving forces, it becomes increasingly 
more important to move away from the conventional central state estimator architecture 
towards a decentralized approach that is more scalable. However, it is unclear from the 
existing research literature just how much decentralization is ideal. To address this 
question, we investigate the impact of the number of sub-problems on the performance of 
the state estimator. 
 xii 
The second challenge is the need for more robust power system cybersecurity. 
Over the past decade, the power grid has become increasingly intertwined with 
information and communication technology, transforming it into a cyber-physical system 
(“smart grid”). While this interconnectivity comes with many benefits, it has also 
rendered the grid more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Currently the main lines of defense 
against grid cyber-attacks are traditional IT cybersecurity measures, such as firewalls, air 
gaps, and antivirus software. While these measures are necessary, they are insufficient 
when used alone since they cannot detect cyber-physical attacks on the measurement 
data. The purpose of the state estimator is to filter out measurement errors, so it is a 
natural candidate for defending against data-related cyber-attacks. In this work, we 
present a cyber-physical security assessment co-simulator that uses an enhanced state 
estimator to identify whether a control command is malicious. We also introduce a novel 
approach for N-1 RTU cyber-physical security assessment that ranks RTUs by how 




1.1 Dissertation Overview 
The objective of this work is to enhance the state estimator software application in 
the energy management system to deal with two major challenges facing the power grid 
of the future. The first challenge is the need to process more measurement data in less 
time. Several major forces are driving this need. First, new sensors such as phasor 
measurement units that have a finer sampling granularity are creating more data for the 
state estimator to process. Next, market deregulation has created the need to monitor 
larger interconnections. Finally, faster system dynamics due to the integration of non-
dispatchable renewables such as wind and solar are creating a need for faster state 
estimation, so that power system operators can have a clearer understanding of the time-
varying system behavior. Conventional state estimators used by regional transmission 
organizations and utilities today have a central architecture, which does not scale well as 
the number of measurements increases. Hence, the existing research literature has 
proposed moving towards a decentralized approach that is more scalable. However, it is 
unclear from the literature just how much decentralization is ideal. To address this 
question, we investigate the impact of the number of sub-problems on the performance of 
the state estimator. 
The second challenge is the need for more robust power system cybersecurity. 
Over the past decade, the power grid has become increasingly intertwined with 
information and communication technology, transforming it into a cyber-physical system 
known as the “smart grid.” While this interconnectivity comes with many benefits, it also 
renders the grid more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Currently the main lines of defense 
against grid cyber-attacks are traditional IT cybersecurity measures, such as firewalls, air 
gaps, and antivirus software. While these measures are necessary, they are insufficient 
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when used alone since they cannot detect cyber-physical attacks, such as attacks on the 
measurement data. The purpose of the state estimator is to filter out measurement errors, 
so it is a natural candidate for defending against cyber-physical attacks. In this work, we 
present a cyber-physical security assessment co-simulator that uses an enhanced state 
estimator to identify whether a control command is malicious.  We also introduce a novel 
approach for N-1 RTU cyber-physical security assessment that ranks RTUs by how 
critical the impact of their loss is on the state estimator. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. The remainder of Chapter 1 introduces 
how power systems work today, the architecture of the energy management system, and 
discusses in greater detail the challenges and needs for the state estimator. Chapter 2 
introduces the three different functions of the state estimator (state estimation, network 
observability analysis, and bad data detection) and the mathematical formulations for 
each. Chapter 3 presents the novel work investigating the impact of the number of sub-
problems on the performance of the state estimator. Chapter 4 reviews the state of power 
system cybersecurity today. Chapter 5 presents the novel work on cyber-physical security 
assessment. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation and lists the contributions of this work. 
1.2 Traditional Power Systems 
The traditional power system has three different functions: generation, 
transmission, and distribution. Historically, large-scale power plants (typically fueled by 
non-renewable resources such as nuclear power, coal, and natural gas) were used to 
generate electricity, because they were more efficient and more cost-effective than 
smaller plants. These generators are located far away from load centers, so the power 
they produce is increased to a very high voltage by step-up transformers at a local 
substation before it is sent across a network of long transmission lines in order to reduce 
the overall resistive losses in the system. Once power reaches a substation near the end 
user, step-down transformers at that substation reduce the voltage to a safer and more 
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useable level. Finally radial distribution lines carry the lower-voltage power to electrical 
loads (residential, commercial, or industrial consumers of electricity). In order for the 
entire interconnected system to maintain stable operation, the total amount of generation 
must equal the total demand of the loads plus system losses at all times. A typical grid 
contains hundreds of generators, hundreds of transformers, thousands of circuit breakers 
that protect major equipment, as well as thousands of high voltage transmission lines and 
lower voltage distribution lines. Figure 1 is a simple illustration of the traditional power 
system architecture. 
 
Figure 1. Traditional power system architecture 
In the continental United States, three alternating-current (AC) power grids have 
evolved to mostly operate independently of one another with only limited transfer of 
electricity between them: the Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and 
the Texas Interconnection. The Eastern and Western Interconnections are also tied to the 
Canadian power grid. These interconnections are made up of over 3,000 electric utilities, 
most of whom do not perform all three functions of generation, transmission, and 
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distribution. In regulated markets, utilities typically own generation, transmission, and 
distribution assets and thus perform all three functions. In deregulated markets, utilities 
tend to engage only in distribution while the transmission network is owned by 
companies and organizations that are obligated to provide indiscriminate access to 
various power producers. 
In deregulated regions in the United States, the transmission network is controlled 
by five independent system operators (ISOs) and four regional transmission organizations 
(RTOs), as shown in Figure 3. These five ISOs are California ISO, Electric Reliability 
Council of Texas (ERCOT), ISO New England, Midcontinent ISO, and New York ISO. 
The four RTOs are ISO New England (also an ISO), Midcontinent ISO (also an ISO), 
PJM Interconnection, and Southwest Power Pool. ISOs operate a regional grid, 
administer the region’s wholesale electricity market, and provide reliability planning for 
the region’s bulk grid. RTOs perform the same functions as ISOs, but they have greater 
responsibility for the transmission network, such as coordinating, controlling, and 
monitoring the power system in their region. In regions where there is no ISO/RTO, 
utilities serve these same functions [1]. 
 
Figure 2. ISOs and RTOs in North America [2] 
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The actual monitoring and operation of the power grids is performed by entities 
known as balancing authorities, whose area of control is known as a balancing area or 
control area. Each balancing authority ensures in real time that the power balance in their 
area between supply and demand is maintained at all times, including system losses and 
transfers of electricity between control areas. ISOs and RTOs also serve as balancing 
authorities. The rest are electric utilities that have taken on the responsibility. In the 
continental United States, there are 66 balancing authorities in total, as shown in Figure 
3. The Eastern Interconnection consists of 31 balancing authorities in the United States 
and 5 in Canada. The Western Interconnection consists of 34 balancing authorities in the 
United States, 2 in Canada, and 1 in Mexico. The Texas Interconnection, which covers 
most of Texas, consists of only a single balancing authority (ERCOT) [3]. 
 
 
Figure 3. Balancing authorities in North America [4] 
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1.3 The Energy Control Center and the Energy Management System 
Every balancing authority has at least two energy control centers (one primary 
and one backup), where power system operators monitor, control, and coordinate the 
physical and economic operation of the power system in that control area. Information 
about monitored equipment in the field (such as analog measurements and status 
indicators) is periodically communicated from remote terminal units (RTUs) located at 
various substations back to the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) master 
station at the energy control center. RTUs are typically scanned at a rate of once every 2 
seconds. This information is then used by the energy management system (EMS), a 
sophisticated suite of tools used by power system operators to monitor and control the 
operation of the transmission and bulk generation system.  
A typical EMS is composed of many complex computer applications, as shown in 
Figure 4. Traditionally these applications can be divided into several overarching 
categories: SCADA/EMS monitoring, economic functions, operations planning, and 
security assessment. Not shown in Figure 4 is the presentation of EMS results to the 
operator in the form of a large-scale visualization. These tools combined provide the 
operator with an accurate picture of the current state of the system as well as offer 
guidelines on control actions that ensure its secure and economic operation. Currently the 
information management and decision making process at each control center is handled 
in a centralized manner, and the computations are typically performed serially. 
The focus of the work in this dissertation is on the state estimator, which falls 
under the SCADA/EMS monitoring category. The state estimator includes three main 
functions: state estimation (determining the most likely state of the system), network 
observability analysis (determining if a unique state estimation solution can be found), 
and bad data detection (determining if measurements are consistent with one another 




Figure 4. Architecture of an energy management system [5] 
 
1.4 New Challenges Facing the Power Grid 
The power grid is currently facing a number of new challenges (illustrated in 
Figure 5). The first challenge is more data than ever before. New technologies such as 
phasor measurement units (PMUs) are straining the grid’s communication and data 
processing infrastructure with their higher measurement rate (typically 30 to 60 samples 
per second) as compared to the SCADA measurement rate (typically one sample every 2 
seconds). Also, utilities need to share more information and monitor the system over 
larger geographic areas due to new market regulations and pricing competition. 
Additionally, the integration of renewables and energy storage, interest in updating the 
distribution system to facilitate demand response, and two-way power flow are driving 
the need for more accurate models and better supervision [6]. All of these driving forces 
are creating more information than ever before that need to be processed and analyzed by 
the EMS in a short period of time. To address this issue, there is interest in moving away 
from the traditional centralized architecture seen in power systems to a more distributed 
one. One alternative is centralized data acquisition but distributed computation across 
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multiple processors in the same computing cluster. Another option is completely separate 
data acquisition and computation. A distributed architecture offers several advantages, 
such as semi-autonomous operation for each region and faster computation due to smaller 
problem sizes. 
 
Figure 5. New challenges facing the power grid 
 
The second challenge is the threat of cyber-attacks. As the smart grid incorporates 
more information and communication technology, more avenues of attack become open 
to malicious cyber actors, rendering the grid more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. While 
traditional cybersecurity measures such as firewalls, air gaps, and antivirus software play 
an important role in protecting the IT infrastructure of the grid, they are insufficient when 
used alone since the power grid is a cyber-physical system that has complex 
interdependencies between the physical electrical network and the communication 
network that supports it. While researchers have been aware of the potential impact of 
cyber-physical attacks on the grid since the mid-2000s, the idea had remained mostly 
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academic in nature. It was not until December 2015 that the first known successful power 
system cyber-attack occurred in Ukraine. Hackers were able to compromise information 
systems of three distribution companies and disrupted power to approximately 225,000 
customers [7]. This event illustrated the potential severity and scale of impact that cyber-
attacks could have on the grid.  
1.4.1 Need for Enhanced State Estimation 
Power system state estimation (SE) is a critical function in the EMS that 
determines the most likely state of the system (bus voltage magnitudes and angles) from 
raw unsynchronized field measurements, which are collected by substation RTUs and 
then sent to the EMS front end computer at the control center. These measurements 
include real and reactive power injections, transmission line flows, and bus voltage 
magnitudes. Because measurements are subject to instrumentation and communication 
errors, it is the role of the state estimator to detect and filter these errors. Power system 
operators rely on the solution of the state estimator to provide them with an accurate 
picture of the system’s real-time behavior. The SE solution serves as the input to other 
downstream EMS applications, such as contingency analysis and optimal power flow. 
Currently SE is serially computed for a single control area. 
 The computational speed of the SE problem depends on the number of 
measurements and the number of states that need to be estimated. As the number of 
sensors in the power system increases, the size of the SE problem will also continue to 
grow. In order to solve this problem in the same amount of time as current operations or 
even less time, the global SE problem must be decomposed into a series of smaller 
problems. This approach can take the form of distributed state estimation (DSE), where 
the SE problem for a single ISO/RTO is rewritten as a series of smaller problems that are 
then solved in parallel. For DSE, the data acquisition is centralized, but the computation 
is distributed across multiple processors, albeit most likely using a cluster in the same 
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physical location. Another form is multi-area state estimation (MASE), where multiple 
control areas coordinate solving their joint SE problem. For MASE, both the data 
acquisition and computation are completely separate. 
 This work proposes to explore two questions that have been largely undiscussed 
in the literature for DSE and MASE: 1) how the global SE problem could be 
automatically decomposed into smaller problems, and 2) the impact of the number of 
sub-problems on the computational speed. In the case of DSE, the boundaries of the sub-
problems have frequently been determined through trial and error, and the number of 
problems is assumed to be given [8]. In MASE, the boundaries for each sub-problem are 
defined by the physical boundaries of each control area, and the number of problems is 
defined by the number of control areas involved in the joint SE. By examining the impact 
of the number of sub-problems on the computational speed, we can begin to understand 
the benefits and limitations of decentralized SE.  
1.4.2 Need for Cyber-Physical Security Assessment 
 Growing concerns over national security have brought intense scrutiny upon the 
vulnerability of power systems to cyber-attacks. Thus an increasingly critical direction of 
research has been to evaluate the potential impact of cyber-attacks on the electric grid. 
Traditionally power system security assessment only takes into account physical 
contingencies, such as the outage of a transmission line or generator. In the event of a 
cyber-attack, communication infrastructure could also be targeted. In general the grid was 
designed with implicit trust in its communication channels and system components, so it 
contains numerous cyber vulnerabilities. Recently there has been a push within the power 
industry to put cybersecurity measures in place and close some of these vulnerabilities. 
However, while traditional methods of cybersecurity protection are important and should 
continue to be implemented, they will not always be successful in preventing attackers 
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from penetrating the system. Thus it is important to understand the impact that various 
cyber-attacks could have on the grid. 
One of the main purposes of the state estimator is to detect and correct erroneous 
measurements before they are propagated to downstream EMS applications, so it can be 
viewed as a natural first line of defense against cyber-attacks on the bulk grid. Erroneous 
measurements usually occur from instrumentation and/or communication failure, but 
threat actors could also maliciously manipulate measurements to intentionally mislead 
power system operators during a data-related cyber-attack. (Refer to Section 4.4.1 where 
the Stuxnet attackers intentionally fooled monitoring systems and human operators into 
believing that the centrifuges were operating normally when they were actually spinning 
themselves apart.) The intent could be either to fool human operators into directly making 
an incorrect control decision for the grid (for example, if operators believed that the grid 
was in a different state than it actually was) or to mask the situation when the grid is in an 
emergency state. 
Another important purpose of the state estimator is to identify when the system 
becomes unobservable (refer to Section 2.3). Even under normal circumstances, the 
system can lose observability when enough critical measurements are lost due to 
instrumentation and/or communication failure. With sufficient knowledge of the system, 
cyber-attackers could seek to exploit this vulnerability by launching denial-of-service 
attacks on RTUs that transmit critical measurements. This could cause power system 
operators to lose situational awareness, and they would become either unable to detect 
that an attack is happening or unable to respond to further attacks. 
Much of the existing literature regarding cyber-attacks on the grid has focused on 
studying stealth deception attacks, such as false data injection where arbitrary errors can 
be introduced into the estimated state by manipulating the power system measurements. 
In this work, we investigate two other types of attacks: 1) bad command injection attacks, 
and 2) denial-of-service attacks on remote terminal units. In bad command injection, an 
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unwanted command is sent to a substation RTU. In a denial-of-service attack on an RTU, 
communication between the attacked RTU and the control center is blocked, so 
measurements from that RTU are not available to the state estimator. By studying these 
two types of attacks, we can better understand and ultimately mitigate them. 
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2 POWER SYSTEM STATE ESTIMATION 
Chapter 2 provides background information on power system state estimation. It 
contains five different sections. Section 2.1 introduces the state estimator as well as its 
role in power system control and operation. Section 2.2 discusses the main state 
estimation methods that are currently used in energy management systems today, 
including the formulations of each algorithm as well as their strengths and weaknesses. 
Section 2.3 presents existing methods for observability analysis. Section 2.4 presents 
existing methods for bad data detection. 
2.1 Introduction 
Power system state estimation is a critical function in the energy management 
system that determines the most likely state of the power system (bus voltages 
represented in phasor form as magnitudes and phase angles) from raw unsynchronized 
field measurements, which are collected by substation RTUs and then sent to the EMS 
front end computer at the control center. These SCADA measurements can include real 
and reactive power injections, transmission line flows, and bus voltage magnitudes. 
Because measurements are subject to instrumentation and communication errors, it is the 
role of the state estimator to detect and filter these errors. Power system operators rely on 
the solution of the state estimator to provide them with an accurate picture of the 
system’s real-time behavior. 
The output of the state estimator, the most likely system state, is the input to many 
other important time-sensitive EMS applications, such as security assessment functions 
like contingency analysis and economic functions like security-constrained optimal 
power flow (as seen in Figure 6). Currently the state estimator problem is solved once 
every half a minute to once every few minutes depending on regional regulations and 
practices. Table 1 shows the exact solution rate for each ISO/RTO in North America. 
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California ISO’s state estimator and New York ISO’s state estimator run automatically 
the most frequently at once every 30 seconds [9], [10] while ERCOT’s state estimator 
runs the least frequently at once every 5 minutes [11], [12]. (The state estimator can run 
upon manual request in addition to automatically running.) The solution rate is directly 
related to how often other EMS applications such as security and market functions are 
automatically run. By contrast, SCADA measurements are collected at a rate of 
approximately one sample every 2-4 seconds. These measurements are typically not 
timestamped or synchronized. A key assumption behind the design of the state estimator 
is that all SCADA measurements are collected at the same point in time or close enough 
to the same point in time as to not make a difference in practical implementation. 
 









California ISO [9] 30 
ERCOT [11], [12] 300 
ISO-NE [13] 180 
Midwest ISO [14] 60 
New York ISO [10] 30  
Southwest Power Pool [15] 90 
 
In addition to state estimation, the state estimator also includes three other 
functions: topology error processing, observability analysis, and bad data 
detection/processing. The topology error processor uses the state estimator inputs to 
determine the most likely physical configuration of the power system (which is outside 
the scope of this work). The observability analysis function determines whether a unique 
solution can be found during state estimation. The bad data detection function flags 
measurements and removes them if they are found to be inconsistent with other system 
measurements. The relationships between all four functions are illustrated in Figure 7. 
Observability analysis and bad data detection are discussed in greater detail in Sections 
2.3 and 2.4 respectively. 
 
Figure 7. State estimator process 
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2.2 Solution Methods 
 There exist many solution methods for power system state estimation. The most 
well-known and widely used is the weighted least squares (WLS) state estimator, which 
was first introduced by F. C. Schweppe in 1970 [16], [17]. Assuming measurement errors 
can be modeled as independent random variables with Gaussian distributions that have 
zero mean and known variance, a minimization problem can be formulated in terms of 
the residuals of each measurement. There are three different versions of the WLS state 
estimator: AC, decoupled, and DC. The main computational burden for AC SE is the 
calculation and decomposition of the gain matrix. If the sensitivity of the real power 
equations to changes in the bus voltage magnitude and the sensitivity of the reactive 
power equations to changes in the bus angles are low, then the decoupled formulation can 
be used instead, in which the off-diagonal blocks of the measurement Jacobian are 
ignored in calculating the gain matrix. The main advantages that it has over the AC 
formulation are 1) it uses less memory, and 2) it is computationally faster due to the use 
of smaller and constant gain sub-matrices [18]. Further simplification leads to the DC 
formulation, where all bus voltage magnitudes are assumed to be 1.0 per unit.  
 The main disadvantage of the WLS state estimator is that when the Normal 
Equations are ill-conditioned, the WLS state estimator may become numerically unstable 
and fail to reach convergence. Ill-conditioning can arise from having a large number of 
injection measurements, very large weighting factors, and the presence of both short and 
long lines at the same bus. To combat the weakness of the Normal Equations, most 
methods avoid using an ill-conditioned gain matrix [19]. Also, the WLS state estimator 
does not deal well with outliers that might be bad data, leading to a need for robust state 
estimators (discussed briefly in Section 2.2.7) [20]. Despite these issues, the conventional 
WLS state estimator is still the most widely used algorithm in EMS systems, especially 
the decoupled and DC formulations. However, AC has become the preferred formulation 
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in power systems literature due to its higher level of accuracy and the cheap availability 
of modern computing power. 
2.2.1 AC Weighted Least Squares 
Let 𝑧 represent a set of power system measurements. Then 𝑧 = ℎ(𝑥) + 𝑒, where 𝑥 
is the estimated state vector (bus voltages and angles), ℎ is the vector of functions relating 
the state variables to the error-free measurements, and 𝑒 is a vector of measurement errors, 
which are assumed to have a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance 𝜎2. 
The WLS estimator minimizes the objective function 
 𝐽(𝑥) = [𝑧 − ℎ(𝑥)]𝑇𝑅−1[𝑧 − ℎ(𝑥)], (1) 
where 𝑅 is a diagonal matrix of the measurement error variances. To obtain the minimum 






𝑅−1 (𝑧 − ℎ(𝑥(𝑘))) (2) 
and set it equal to 0. Here 𝑥(𝑘) is the state vector at iteration 𝑘. 𝐻 is the measurement 




By applying the Gauss-Newton method [19], we obtain the Normal Equations  
 [𝐺(𝑥(𝑘))]Δ𝑥(𝑘+1) = −𝑔(𝑥(𝑘)), (3) 






 𝑅−1𝐻(𝑥(𝑘)). (4) 
Then 𝑥 is solved for iteratively until a convergence tolerance  is reached. The 
expressions for ℎ and 𝐻 are presented in Section 2.2.2. 
The exact algorithm is described in detail below: 
Step 1. Set iteration index 𝑘 equal to 0. 
Step 2. Initialize the state vector 𝑥(𝑘), typically as a flat start (voltage magnitudes 
are set to 1, and voltage angles are set to 0).  
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Step 3. Calculate gain matrix 𝐺(𝑥(𝑘)). 
Step 4. Calculate −𝑔(𝑥(𝑘)). 
Step 5. Decompose 𝐺(𝑥(𝑘)) using Cholesky factorization and solve for Δ𝑥(𝑘+1). 
Step 6. Check if max|Δ𝑥(𝑘)| ≤  (a user-defined stopping condition)? If yes, stop. 
If no, update 𝑥(𝑘+1) = 𝑥(𝑘) + Δ𝑥(𝑘) and 𝑘 = 𝑘 + 1, then go back to Step 3. 
2.2.2 Polar and Rectangular Coordinates 
Similar to the power flow algorithm, AC state estimation can be formulated in 
either polar or rectangular coordinates. Polar coordinates are more intuitive in power 
systems analysis since bus voltages are already typically represented in phasor form. 
However, rectangular coordinates can enable simpler computation. 
Assume there exists a power system with 𝑁 buses and 𝑀 sensor measurements. In 
polar coordinates, the voltage at bus 𝑎 is represented in its phasor form as 𝑉𝑎 = |𝑉𝑎|∠𝜃𝑎. 
In rectangular coordinates, the voltage at bus 𝑎 is represented in Cartesian form as 𝑉𝑎 =
𝑒𝑎 + 𝑗𝑓𝑎. This expression can be rewritten as: 
 
𝑒𝑎 = 𝑉𝑎cos (𝜃𝑎) 
(5) 
 






2.  (7) 
AC WLS SE in Polar Coordinates 
In polar coordinates, the state vector 𝑥(𝑘) for a system with 𝑁 buses and 𝑀  
measurements contains 2𝑁 − 1 elements with 𝑁 voltage magnitudes and 𝑁 − 1 voltage 
angles, since the angle of the slack (reference) bus is assumed to be 0. Hence the state 
vector would be:   
 𝑥(𝑘) = [𝜃2 𝜃3 ⋯ 𝜃𝑁 𝑉1 𝑉2 𝑉3 … 𝑉𝑁]
𝑇. (8) 
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In ℎ(𝑥(𝑘)) ∈ ℝ2𝑁−1, the expressions for the real and reactive power injections at 
bus 𝑚 are: 
 









where 𝐺𝑎𝑏 , 𝐵𝑎𝑏,  𝐺𝑎𝑎, and  𝐵𝑎𝑎 represent the respective entries of the bus admittance 
matrix 𝑌𝑏𝑢𝑠 = 𝐺 + 𝑗𝐵. Following the two-port 𝜋-model of a transmission line (as seen in 
Figure 8), the expressions for the real and reactive power flow from bus 𝑎 to bus 𝑏 are: 
 𝑃𝑎𝑏 = 𝑉𝑎
2𝑔𝑎𝑏 + 𝑉𝑎𝑉𝑏(−𝑔𝑎𝑏 cos(𝜃𝑎𝑏)−𝑏𝑎𝑏 sin(𝜃𝑎𝑏)) 
 
(11) 




+ 𝑏𝑎𝑏) + 𝑉𝑎𝑉𝑏(−𝑔𝑎𝑏 sin(𝜃𝑎𝑏) + 𝑏𝑎𝑏 cos(𝜃𝑎𝑏)) 
 
(12) 
where 𝑔𝑎𝑏 + 𝑗𝑏𝑎𝑏 is the line impedance and 𝐵𝑠ℎ is the line shunt capacitance. 
 
Figure 8. Two-port transmission line model 
 














































In 𝐻(𝑥(𝑘)), the entries related to real power injections at bus 𝑎 are: 
 𝛿𝑃𝑎
𝛿𝜃𝑎


















= 𝑉𝑎(𝐺𝑎𝑏 cos(𝜃𝑎𝑏) + 𝐵𝑎𝑏 sin(𝜃𝑎𝑏)) 
(17) 
The entries related to reactive power injections at bus 𝑎 are: 
 𝛿𝑄𝑎
𝛿𝜃𝑎


















= 𝑉𝑎(𝐺𝑎𝑏 sin(𝜃𝑎𝑏) − 𝐵𝑎𝑏 cos(𝜃𝑎𝑏)) 
(21) 
The entries related to real power flows between bus 𝑎 and bus 𝑏 are: 
 𝛿𝑃𝑎𝑏
𝛿𝜃𝑎












= −𝑉𝑎(𝑔𝑎𝑏 cos(𝜃𝑎𝑏)+ 𝑏𝑎𝑏 sin(𝜃𝑎𝑏)) 
(25) 
The entries related to reactive power flows between bus 𝑎 and bus 𝑏 are: 
 𝛿𝑄𝑎𝑏
𝛿𝜃𝑎
















= −𝑉𝑎(𝑔𝑎𝑏 sin(𝜃𝑎𝑏) − 𝑏𝑎𝑏 cos(𝜃𝑎𝑏)) 
(29) 
The entries related to voltage magnitude at bus 𝑎 are: 
 𝛿𝑉𝑎
𝛿𝜃𝑎
= 0 (30) 
 𝛿𝑉𝑎
𝛿𝜃𝑏
= 0 (31) 
 𝛿𝑉𝑎
𝛿𝑉𝑎
= 1 (32) 
 𝛿𝑉𝑎
𝛿𝑉𝑏
= 0 (33) 
AC WLS SE in Rectangular Coordinates 
In rectangular coordinates, the state vector 𝑥(𝑘) for a system with 𝑁 buses and 
𝑀 measurements contains 2𝑁 − 1 elements with 𝑁 real voltage components 𝑒 and 𝑁 − 1 
imaginary voltage components 𝑓, since the angle of the slack (reference) bus is assumed 
to be 0. Hence the state vector would be:   
 𝑥(𝑘) = [𝑒1 𝑒2 𝑒3 ⋯ 𝑒𝑁 𝑓2 𝑓3 … 𝑓𝑁]
𝑇. (34) 
In ℎ(𝑥(𝑘)) ∈ ℝ2𝑁−1, the expressions for the real and reactive power injections at 
bus 𝑎 are [21]: 
 















𝐺𝑎𝑏 , 𝐵𝑎𝑏 ,  𝐺𝑎𝑎 , and  𝐵𝑎𝑎 represent the respective real and imaginary entries of the bus 
admittance matrix 𝑌𝑏𝑢𝑠 ∈ ℝ
𝑁×𝑁, where 𝑌𝑏𝑢𝑠 = 𝐺 + 𝑗𝐵. 
The expressions for the real and reactive power flow from bus 𝑎 to bus 𝑏 are: 
 𝑃𝑎𝑏 = (𝑒𝑎
2 + 𝑓𝑎
2)𝑔𝑎𝑏 − 𝑔𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑒𝑏 + 𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑓𝑏 − 𝑔𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑎𝑓𝑏 − 𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑎𝑒𝑏 
 
(37) 










where 𝑔𝑎𝑏 + 𝑗𝑏𝑎𝑏 is the line impedance and 𝐵𝑠ℎ is the line shunt capacitance. 

























































In 𝐻(𝑥(𝑘)), the entries related to real power injections at bus 𝑎 are: 
 𝛿𝑃𝑎
𝛿𝑒𝑎


















= 𝐺𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑎 − 𝐵𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑎 
(44) 




















= −𝐺𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑎 − 𝐵𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑎 
(48) 
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The entries related to real power flows between bus 𝑎 and bus 𝑏 are: 
 𝛿𝑃𝑎𝑏
𝛿𝑒𝑎












= −𝑔𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑎 + 𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑎 
(52) 





















= 𝑔𝑎𝑏𝑒𝑎 + 𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑓𝑎 
(56) 


















= 0 (60) 
2.2.3 Computational Challenges 
The main computational burden associated with AC SE is the calculation and 
decomposition of the gain matrix 𝐺 = 𝐻𝑇𝑅−1𝐻. Because the measurement Jacobian 𝐻 is 
sparse and 𝑅 is diagonal, 𝐺 ∈ ℝ(2𝑁−1)×(2𝑁−1) is structurally/numerically symmetric, 
sparse (although less sparse than 𝐻), and non-negative definite in general (positive 
definite for a fully observable network). For computational and memory efficiency, the 








where 𝐻𝑘 is a 𝑘-th row of the measurement Jacobian (very sparse) and 𝑅𝑘𝑘 is the corresponding 
element of the measurement covariance matrix. 
 By applying Cholesky decomposition to 𝐺, we obtain the non-unique triangular 
factors 𝐿 and 𝐿𝑇, where 𝐺 = 𝐿𝐿𝑇. The sparsity of 𝐿 may vary, depending on the way the 
decomposition is performed and based on the ordering method. Note that for systems that 
are not fully observable, the Cholesky decomposition may not exist, and hence no state 
estimation solution can be found (see Section 2.3). 
 Assuming a Cholesky decomposition exists, it is combined with the Normal 
Equations to obtain 
 [𝐿(𝑥(𝑘))𝐿(𝑥(𝑘))
𝑇
] Δ𝑥(𝑘+1) = −𝑔(𝑥(𝑘)). (62) 
Then forward substitution and back substitution steps are used to solve for entries of 
Δ𝑥(𝑘+1). 
2.2.4 Decoupled Weighted Least Squares 
One way to reduce the computational burden of calculating and decomposing 𝐺 is 
to use several simplifying assumptions to arrive at an approximate gain matrix with 
constant sub-matrices. Because the sub-matrices are constant and smaller, this 
formulation requires less overall memory usage, and Cholesky decomposition only needs 
to be performed during the first iteration. Similar to the power flow algorithm, those 
assumptions are: 
• The sensitivity of the real power equations with respect to changes in bus 
voltage magnitudes is low. 
• The sensitivity of the reactive power equations with respect to changes in bus 
voltage angles is low. 
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Then the new approximate gain matrix is 






where = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔([𝑅𝐴 𝑅𝑅]), 𝐺𝐴𝐴 = 𝐻𝐴𝐴
𝑇𝑅𝐴
−1𝐻𝐴𝐴, and 𝐺𝑅𝑅 = 𝐻𝑅𝑅
𝑇𝑅𝑅
−1𝐻𝑅𝑅. Then solve  










where Δ𝑧𝐴 = 𝑧𝐴 − ℎ𝐴(?̂?) and Δ𝑧𝑅 = 𝑧𝑅 − ℎ𝑅(?̂?). 
2.2.5 DC Weighted Least Squares 
Further assumptions can be made to completely simplify the system models. 
Again, similar to power flow, those assumptions are: 
• All bus voltage magnitudes are known to be 1.0 per unit. 
• Shunt elements and branch resistances are ignored. 
• Only real power measurements are considered. 
In this simplest case, the relationship between the real power measurements and the bus 
angles is linear: 
 𝑧𝐴 = 𝐻𝐴𝐴𝑥𝐴 + 𝑒𝐴 
 
(67) 









2.2.6 Key Assumptions and Limitations 
As mentioned in the previous sections, there are multiple assumptions behind the 
design of the WLS state estimator, and some necessary conditions need to be met in order 
for a unique and accurate solution to be found. These assumptions and necessary 
conditions are summarized below: 
• Measurement errors are assumed to be independent and have a Gaussian 
distribution with a mean of 0 and a known variance of 𝜎2. These variances are 
chosen based on assumptions regarding metering accuracy and/or historical 
data for the measurement errors. 
• The gain matrix 𝐺 needs to be relatively well-conditioned in the Normal 
Equations, or else the WLS state estimator may become numerically unstable 
and fail to reach convergence. Ill-conditioning can arise from having a large 
number of injection measurements, very large weighting factors, and the 
presence of both short and long lines at the same bus. When the gain matrix is 
ill-conditioned, alternate methods could be used instead of Cholesky 
factorization to mitigate the computational issues. 
• The state estimation solution cannot be found when the Cholesky 
decomposition does not exist (e.g. for many systems that are not fully 
observable). 
• There must be at least one voltage measurement for each observable island. 
2.2.7 Robust State Estimation 
Although the focus of this dissertation is on the WLS state estimator due to its 
prevalence in the power industry, it is worthwhile to briefly review the problem 
formulation for robust state estimation since it has some advantages compared to the 
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WLS formulation. First we must define statistical robustness. A state estimator is robust 
if the estimated system state is insensitive to major deviations in a limited number of 
redundant measurements. There is frequently a trade-off between robustness and 
computational speed. As discussed in Section 2.2.6, one major assumption behind the 
design of the WLS state estimator is that measurement errors are independent, and each 
error has a Gaussian distribution with a mean of 0 and a known variance. While this 
assumption may be generally true under normal operating conditions, there are 
occasionally situations where gross errors can occur due to telemetry noise/failure or 
even potentially cyber-attacks (which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4). 
Before reviewing specific robust state estimation methods, first the definition of 
an outlier needs to be introduced. In statistics, an outlier is an observation point that is 
distant from other observations due to either natural variability in the measurement or 
measurement error. In power systems, outliers could be either measurements that do not 
contain any actual error but due to the structure of its corresponding equation appear 
unusual, or they could be incorrectly recorded measurements that differ from their actual 
value. Naturally occurring outliers are difficult to identify and will strongly bias the state 
estimate when they contain errors. An outlier measurement that has an undue amount of 
influence on the state estimate and where the corresponding row of the measurement 
Jacobian 𝐻 lies away from the rest of the factors is referred to as a leverage point. 
There are many different objective functions and solution methods for robust state 






𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑧 = ℎ(𝑥) + 𝑟 
 
(69) 
where 𝜌(𝑟𝑖) is a selected function of the measurement residual 𝑟𝑖, 𝑧 ∈ ℝ
𝑀 is the set of 
measurements, 𝑥 ∈ ℝ2𝑁−1 is the state vector, and ℎ(𝑥) ∈ ℝ2𝑁−1 is the measurement 
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function that corresponds to perfect error-free measurements. The function 𝜌 should have 
at least the following properties: 
• 𝜌(𝑟) = 0 when 𝑟 = 0 
• 𝜌(𝑟) > 0 ∀ 𝑟 
• 𝜌(𝑟) = 𝜌(−𝑟) 
• 𝜌(𝑟) is monotonically increasing in both +𝑟 and −𝑟 directions 
One example of a function that satisfies all of these conditions is the Least Absolute 
Value (LAV) M-estimator 𝜌(𝑟𝑖) = |𝑟𝑖|.  
 In general, M-estimation problems can be solved using algorithms such as 
Newton’s method and iteratively reweighted least squares. The LAV estimator, which 
can be formulated as a linear programming problem, can take advantage of optimization 
algorithms such as the simplex and interior point methods. 
2.3 Network Observability Analysis 
The objective of observability analysis is to determine whether a unique estimate 
can be found for the power system state based on the network topology as well as the 
type and location of available measurements. This analysis is first performed offline 
during the initial installation of a state estimator to verify whether the existing installed 
sensors are sufficient to fully observe the system. It is also performed online prior to 
running the state estimator to ensure that an estimate can be found from the 
measurements received at each time step. Sometimes communication or metering 
errors/failures can cause a power system to become unobservable, in which case the 
system will be divided into a series of isolated observable islands, each with its own 
independent phase angle reference (i.e. slack bus). 
Observability analysis methods can be divided into two different classes: 
numerical and topological. Both classes of methods were developed using the same 
general assumptions: 
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• Paired 𝑃 and 𝑄 measurements (i.e. each real injection/flow measurement has a 
corresponding reactive injection/flow measurement) 
• Decoupled measurement model (see Section 2.2.4, cannot be used if 
assumptions do not hold or if current magnitude measurements are included) 
2.3.1 Numerical Methods 
There are multiple methods for numerical observability analysis. The method 
described below is based on the nodal variable formulation. Referring back to the 
decoupled state estimation model from Section 2.2.4, 𝜃 − 𝑃 observability and 𝑉 − 𝑄 
observability can be tested separately if the 𝑃 and 𝑄 measurements are paired. Unlike in 
𝜃 − 𝑃 analysis, there needs to be at least one voltage magnitude measurement in 𝑉 − 𝑄 
analysis for each observable island. 
The observability of a system depends solely on the topology of the system and 
the type/location of measurements. It does not depend on branch parameters or the 
system operating state, so simplifying assumptions can be made for the system 
parameters. For example, all branches can be assumed to have an impedance of 𝑗1.0 per-
unit, and all bus voltages can be assumed to be 1.0 per-unit as seen in the DC state 
estimation model (as seen in Section 2.2.5). Then the DC power flows can be written as 
 𝑃𝑏 = 𝐴𝜃 
 
(70) 
where 𝑃𝑏 ∈ ℝ
𝑀 is the vector of branch power flows, 𝐴 ∈ ℝ𝑀×𝑁 is the branch-bus 
incidence matrix, and 𝜃 ∈ ℝ𝑁 is the vector of bus voltage phase angles. The branch-bus 
incidence matrix is defined as 
 𝐴(𝑖, 𝑗) = {
1 if bus 𝑗 𝑖s the sending end of branch 𝑖





If there is an estimate 𝜃 such that  




yet the corresponding branch flow is nonzero, i.e. 
 𝑃𝑏 = 𝐴𝜃 ≠ 0 
 
(73) 
then this estimate 𝜃 is an unobservable state, and the branches 𝑏 that have nonzero flows 
are unobservable branches. 
 The algorithm for identifying observable islands is as follows: 
 Step 1. Remove all branches that have no incident measurements. 
 Step 2. Form 𝐺𝐴𝐴 = 𝐻𝐴𝐴
𝑇 𝑅𝐴
−1𝐻𝐴𝐴. 
Step 3. Factorize 𝐺𝐴𝐴 using Cholesky factorization. When a zero pivot is 
encountered, replace that entry with 1.0 and the corresponding entry of the right 
hand side is assigned an arbitrary value. 
Step 4. Identify and remove all unobservable branches and all injections that are 
incident to these unobservable branches. 
Step 5. If no more unobservable branches can be found, identify the observable 
islands that are divided by the unobservable branches and stop. Else proceed back 
to Step 2. 
2.3.2 Topological Methods 
There are also multiple methods for topological observability analysis. (However, 
there is considerably less literature on the subject compared to numerical observability 
analysis.) Topological methods differ from numerical methods in that no floating point 
computations are necessary. Instead they are based entirely on logical operations and thus 
only need information about network topology and measurement type/location. Similar to 
the numerical methods, it is assumed that measurements are available in real and reactive 
pairs, and thus the real part of the decoupled measurement model can be used for 
observability analysis. 
The seminal paper on topological observability analysis [22] was published in 
1980. In it, the authors developed a new graph theoretical algorithm after recognizing that 
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the rank of the 𝐻 matrix depends only on the system topology. The important theoretical 
conclusion from their paper is that 𝐻 is full rank (i.e. the associated network 𝑋 is 
observable) if and only if there exists a spanning tree 𝑇 of full rank (a spanning tree is a 
tree that is incident to every bus of network 𝑋). A tree 𝑇 is full rank if every branch of 𝑇 
can be assigned in a unique fashion. The algorithm they proposed is divided into two 
parts, one that processes the line flow measurements and one that processes the injection 
measurements. The algorithm works as follows: 
Part 1. Construct a forest 𝐹𝑙 of branches with line flow measurements. Remove branches 
that form loops with 𝐹𝑙 (cotree branches). Remove branches that are incident to no 
measurement. Identify and label as redundant injection measurements that are incident 
only to branches of 𝐹𝑙 or to cotree branches. Identify the boundary injection 
measurements. Perform an initial measurement assignment of the branches of 𝐹𝑙 (i.e. 
assign each branch to the flow measurement represented by that branch), which will be 
known as 𝑎. 
Part 2. Take the boundary injection measurements from Part 1. Process them in stages 
one at a time until 𝑇 is a critical tree or until all boundary injections have been 
considered. The inputs to each stage are the boundary injection under consideration 𝑥∗ 
and the forest (with measurement assignment) output from previous stages. The output of 
each stage is an updated forest (with measurement assignment) that has fewer 
components or contains more unmeasured nodes than the input forest. 
Step 2.1. Let 𝐹∗ be the component of the forest of flow-measured branches that 
contains 𝑥∗ and 𝑇∗ be the input forest that contains 𝑥∗. The tree 𝑇∗ is directed away 
from 𝑥∗ as follows. Every branch 𝑏 in 𝑇∗ that is incident to 𝑥∗ has 𝑥∗ labeled as the 
negative (−) node of b, and the other node is labeled as positive (+). 
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Step 2.2. After 𝑇∗ has been directed away from 𝑥∗, a sequence of pairwise disjoint 
sets of branches 𝐵𝑖
𝑙 is constructed iteratively. 𝐵0
𝑙  is set equal to 𝐹∗. 𝐵1
𝑙  consists of 
all branches incident to 𝑥∗ that are not in 𝐵0
𝑙 .  
Step 2.3. The steps for deriving 𝐵𝑖+1
𝑙  are shown in Figure 9. Select the first 
branch 𝑏 in 𝐵1
𝑙  . Set 𝑥 as the positive node of 𝑏. Check to see if 𝑏 is in the edges 
of the input forest 𝑇∗
𝑙. If so, check if the initial measurement assignment of 𝑏 is to 
node 𝑥. If not, check to see if 𝑥 is in the nodes of the input forest 𝑇∗
𝑂 . If either 𝑥 is 
in the nodes of the input forest 𝑇∗
𝑂 or the initial measurement assignment of 𝑏 is 
not to node 𝑥, set the negative node of 𝑏 to be the T-predecessor branch of node 
𝑥. If the initial measurement assignment of 𝑏− is to node 𝑥, then add every branch 
that is incident to node 𝑥 that is not in a previous 𝐵𝑖
𝑙 to 𝐵𝑖+1
𝑙 . If not, add only 𝑏− to 
𝐵𝑖+1
𝑙 . Continue processing each branch until all branches are processed or if a sink 
is hit. 
Step 2.4. If a sink (an unmeasured node not already in 𝑇∗ or a node belonging to 
another component of 𝑇) is hit by a branch 𝑏, then a backtracking process is 
initiated (illustrated in Figure 10). The procedure recursively selects a sequence of 
branches, one from each 𝐵𝑖
𝑙, modifies the tree, and updates the assignment. There 
are five simple subroutines: ‘add to tree,’ ‘any,’ ‘delete,’ ‘erase,’ and ‘search.’ 
‘Add to tree’ adds 𝑏 to 𝑇𝑙 and assigns 𝑥 to 𝑏, i.e. 𝑎(𝑏) = 𝑥. ‘Any’ searches 
through 𝐵𝑖
𝑙 for any branch that is incident to 𝑥. ‘Delete’ removes 𝑏 from 𝑇𝑙. 
‘Erase’ removes 𝑏− = −𝑇(𝑥) from 𝑇
𝑙 and any other T-predecessor branches. 
‘Search’ looks for a branch in 𝐵𝑖
𝑙 that is also in 𝑇∗









Figure 10. Topological OA flow chart for processing the next branch [22] 
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After this seminal paper was published, the authors published a number of other 
papers related to topological observability analysis and state estimation. Most notably, 
they developed an algorithm that determines the maximal observable subnetwork, i.e. the 
largest region where bus voltages may be estimated when confronted with a deficiency in 
measurements [23]. They also developed an algorithm to adding pseudo measurements of 
estimated bus loads to improve network observability [24]. In addition, they worked on 
determining the detectability of bad measurements based on the network topology and 
location measurements (discussed in Section 2.4) [25]. 
A second influential paper on topological observability analysis [26] was 
published in 1982. The authors directly search for an observable spanning tree in the 
measurement graph, using an algorithm for matroid intersections. They reframed the 
topological observability analysis problem as a graph with 𝑁 vertices and 𝐿 edges, where 
each edge needs to be colored with (i.e. assigned) one of 𝐾 + 1 colors. The objective is to 
find a spanning tree such that for each color, at most one edge of the spanning tree has 
that color. Similar to [22], the flow measurements are processed first, followed by the 
injection measurements. The exact algorithm can be found in [26], Figure 2. 
Since those two papers, other papers on the subject have emerged. In 1991, a new 
algorithm that used the concept of augmenting sequences, including a direct comparison 
between the proposed algorithm and a numerical observability analysis algorithm, was 
presented, showing that their topological algorithm was considerably faster [27]. At the 
same time, another paper that involved a fast algorithm for finding the minimum 
spanning tree of an augmented graph was presented [28]. The first author of [28] also 
explored using genetic algorithms to solve the combinatorial problem of topological 
observability [29]. Between 2005 and 2006, more papers that used genetic algorithms and 
artificial neural networks were presented. This body of available research literature on 
topological observability analysis is summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Topological Observability Analysis Literature Review 
Year Method Author Ref 
1980 Heuristic Krumpholz et al. [22] 
1982 Matroid intersection Quintana et al. [26] 
1991 Augmenting sequences Nucera and Gilles [27] 
1991 Augmented graph Mori and Tsuzuki [28] 
1992 Genetic algorithms Mori and Tanaka [29] 
2005 Artificial neural 
networks 
Jain et al. 
[30] 
2006 Heuristic Jain et al. [31] 
2006 Genetic algorithms Vazquez-Rodriguez et al. [32] 
 
2.4 Bad Data Detection 
A key objective of the state estimator is to detect and remove erroneous 
measurements, assuming there is sufficient redundancy in the measurement set so that 
random errors can be filtered out. Measurement errors occur due to a variety of reasons: 
• Sensor noise, bias, drift, failure, or wiring mistakes 
• Communication noise, error, or failure 
• Intentional manipulation of sensor measurements during a cyber-attack 
Measurements that are obviously wrong or physically impossible (such as negative 
voltage magnitudes, extremely large measurements, etc.) can be easily detected through 
simple logic checks. However, more subtle inconsistencies can be difficult to detect 
without advanced techniques. 
 In WLS state estimation, bad data detection and removal are performed after the 
estimation process. Bad data can manifest as either a single erroneous measurement or 
multiple erroneous measurements. Multiple bad data can be further categorized into non-
interacting bad data, interacting but non-conforming bad data, and interacting and 
conforming bad data. Interacting measurements are measurements that are strongly 
correlated whose errors significantly affect one another’s estimated values. Conforming 
measurements are measurements that appear to be consistent with one another. 
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 The degree to which measurements are interacting can be measured by the 
residual covariance matrix 𝛺. If 𝛺(𝑖, 𝑗) ≥  (user-defined threshold based on the network 
and measurement topology), then measurement 𝑖 and measurement 𝑗 are strongly 
interacting. Otherwise, they are considered to be weakly interacting or non-interacting. 
The matrix is calculated as 
  𝛺 = 𝑆𝑅 
 
(74) 
Based on the DC state estimation model (see Section 2.2.5), the WLS estimator is  








where Δ𝑧𝐴 = 𝐻𝐴𝐴Δ𝑥 + 𝑒. The estimated value of Δ𝑧𝐴 is Δ?̂?𝐴 = 𝐻𝐴𝐴Δ?̂?𝐴 = 𝐾Δ𝑧. The hat 
matrix 𝐾 is equal to  






𝐾 can be used to provide an idea of the local measurement redundancy around each 
sensor. A large diagonal entry relative to the off-diagonal entries in 𝐾 indicates poor local 
redundancy. The residual sensitivity matrix 𝑆 measures the sensitivity of measurement 
residuals to measurement errors and is equal to  
 𝑆 = 𝐼 − 𝐾 
 
(77) 
where 𝐼 is the identity matrix. 
In general, measurements are classified into two different groups: critical and 
redundant. The removal of a critical measurement from the measurement set would cause 
the system to become unobservable. The measurement residual of a critical measurement 
is always zero. Sometimes critical measurements can occur in pairs or k-tuples, in which 
case the removal of all of these measurements will cause the system to become 
unobservable. A redundant measurement is a non-critical measurement, and it has a 
nonzero measurement residual. Bad data can only be detected if removing the erroneous 
measurement does not render the system unobservable. Hence, errors that occur in critical 
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measurements cannot be detected. A single measurement containing bad data can be 
identified if and only if it is not critical and it does not belong to a critical pair. 
2.4.1 The Largest Normalized Residual Test  
The most commonly used bad data detection test in EMS systems today is the 









Assuming there is a single bad measurement that is not a critical measurement or a 
member of a critical pair, the largest normalized residual will correspond to the erroneous 
measurement. This will also hold true for multiple bad data as long as the measurements 
are non-interacting. The algorithm is as follows: 
 Step 1. Solve WLS state estimation and obtain the measurement residual vector 
 𝑟𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖 − ℎ𝑖(?̂?). 
 Step 2. Compute the normalized residuals. 
 Step 3. Find the index 𝑘 that corresponds to the largest 𝑟𝑖
𝑁. 
Step 4. If 𝑟𝑘
𝑁 > 𝑐 (user-defined threshold), remove the 𝑘-th measurement which is 
suspected to be bad and proceed to Step 1. Else stop, no bad measurements are 
suspected. 
2.4.2 Key Assumptions and Limitations 
As discussed in the previous sections, existing bad data detection techniques such 
as the largest normalized residual test will definitely detect and remove a bad 
measurement if: 
• The measurement is not critical (i.e. removing it will not make the system 
unobservable). 
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• Removing the measurement does not create any critical measurements. 
If there is multiple bad data, then the largest normalized residual test can detect 
bad measurements one at a time if the measurements are non-interacting. If there are 
multiple interacting bad measurements: 
• The largest normalized residual test may still correctly identify bad data if the 
measurements are non-conforming (i.e. the errors are not consistent with each 
other). 




3 DECOMPOSITION-BASED STATE ESTIMATION 
In this chapter, we present a new faster state estimation method, which involves 
automatically dividing the central SE problem for a large system into a series of smaller 
problems as well as empirically exploring the effect of the number of sub-problems on 
the computational speed [33]. Currently the state estimator performs its data processing 
and computation for a single control area in a central location (the control center). These 
computations are carried out serially once every 30 seconds to few minutes, depending on 
the balancing authority (see Table 1). As the number of devices used to monitor the 
power grid increases and the need to monitor very large interconnections grows, 
centralized state estimation becomes too slow to be feasible. Our proposed solution to 
these challenges is decomposition-based state estimation. 
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 motivates the need for 
decomposition-based state estimation and provides the scope of the research. Section 3.2 
reviews the relevant research literature on speeding up the performance of the state 
estimator. Section 3.3 introduces the general consensus ADMM problem as well as 
discusses its merits and disadvantages as a distributed optimization method. Section 3.4 
describes the importance of referencing the local slack buses to a single global slack bus. 
Section 3.5 discusses the methodology behind the fast decomposition-based SE 
algorithm. Section 3.6 introduces a problem formulation that would achieve greater 
solution accuracy. 
3.1 Introduction 
Centralized state estimation becomes infeasible with an increase in the number of 
monitoring devices and the need driven by market deregulation for utilities to monitor 
very large interconnections. First, as more measurements are added into the system, more 
speed is needed to process them in real time. Secondly, faster processing would enable 
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real-time wide-area SE [6]. Because the speed of SE depends on the size of the problem 
(the number of measurements and the number of states to be estimated), the ability to 
decompose the global SE problem into smaller problems is essential. Once the problem is 
decomposed, then parallel or distributed computing can be applied to each problem, as 
seen in distributed state estimation (DSE) where multiple nodes work together to jointly 
estimate the state of an area [34]. A related problem to DSE is multi-area state estimation 
(MASE), where several control areas work together to jointly estimate their combined 
state [35], [36]. 
This chapter explores two questions that have been largely undiscussed in the 
literature for DSE and MASE: 1) how the global SE problem could be automatically 
decomposed into smaller problems, and 2) the impact of the number of sub-problems on 
the computational speed. In the case of DSE, the boundaries of the sub-problems have 
frequently been determined through trial and error, and the number of problems is 
assumed to be given [8]. In MASE, the boundaries for each sub-problem are defined by 
the physical boundaries of each control area, and the number of problems is defined by 
the number of control areas involved in the joint SE. The results from this work suggest 
that methodical decomposition of the global SE problem beyond the natural boundaries 
of a control area can significantly increase the speed of SE.  
The main contributions of this work are as follows. First, we introduce automatic 
graph partitioning as a systematic method for virtually dividing a power system into an 
arbitrary number of sub-areas. Then we propose a fast decomposition-based SE approach, 
an enhancement to traditional WLS SE, which uses the partitioning results to 
automatically decompose the global SE problem into smaller sub-problems and solve 
them in unison using the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). Lastly we 
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explore empirically the impact of the number of sub-problems on the computational 
speed of the global SE problem for a serial implementation and extrapolate the speedup 
seen for the considered IEEE test cases to larger power systems. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first time the impact of partition granularity on the speed of the SE 
problem has been quantitatively evaluated. The proposed approach enables an 
investigation of how far typical SE problems should be decomposed for the best speed 
gains. 
3.2 Relevant Work 
In the literature, there are two related branches of research that focus on speeding 
up the computational performance of the state estimator. One is DSE, where the burden 
of SE for a large system is spread over multiple processors or threads (frequently in the 
same geographic location). The other is MASE, where the burden of SE for a very large 
interconnection is distributed over multiple processors for each control area (in separate 
geographic locations). A good survey of different DSE and MASE schemes from prior to 
2010 is provided in [35]. The authors classified different schemes by the level of area 
overlap, the computing architecture, the level of coordination, measurement 
synchronization, process synchronization, and solution methodology.  
For the level of area overlap, schemes could either have completely non-
overlapping areas, boundary-bus overlapping areas, virtual bus overlapping areas, tie-line 
overlapping areas, or extended overlapping areas (see Figure 11). For the architecture, 
there are hierarchical and decentralized schemes. In a hierarchical architecture, a central 
coordinating computer communicates with each local state estimator, which is run on 
local processors either in separate or the same geographic location. In a decentralized 
architecture, each local state estimator communicates with its neighbors without the help 
of a central computer. For the level of coordination, each area can submit its results to the 
 42 
central processor after full convergence of its local SE, each area can submit its results 
after every local iteration, or some combination of the two approaches could apply. For 
process synchronization, each local processor can be run synchronously for a hierarchical 
architecture where the coordination takes place at the central SE level, synchronously or 
asynchronously if the coordination takes place at the iteration level, or asynchronously 
for a decentralized architecture. Finally, regarding solution methodology, the majority of 
surveyed methods rely on the WLS SE formulation while decentralized schemes tend to 
use Lagrangian relaxation-based algorithms or formulate the WLS equations as an 
optimization problem.  
 
Figure 11. Different levels of area overlap for MASE schemes [35]: a) non-overlapping 
areas; b) boundary-bus overlapping areas; c) virtual bus overlapping areas; d) tie-line 
overlapping areas; e) extended overlapping areas. 
 
Since 2010, there have been some other relevant works on DSE and MASE. 
Meliopoulos et al. [37] introduced a fully distributed three-phase linear state estimator at 
the substation level, which uses a detailed substation model and all locally available 
measurements including those from PMUs. Xie et al. [38], [39] described a fully 
distributed SE algorithm that does not require local observability of all control areas and 
where the communication topology can differ from the physical topology. Kekatos and 
Giannakis [36] presented a fully distributed robust SE algorithm that uses ADMM, which 
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also does not require local observability. Both algorithms use the DC state estimation 
model, which as discussed in Section 2.2 we know to be not as accurate as the AC model.   
 












[37] Meliopoulos NO NE-H - P It 
[38], [39] Xie NO NE-H Opt C It 
[36] Kekatos and 
Giannakis 
MO NE-O Opt C It 
[40] Karimipour and 
Dinavahi 
NO NE-H Unknown P It 
a  NO: non-overlap; MO: minimally overlap; FO: fully overlap. 
b  NE: Normal equations; R: relaxation; O: optimization; H: heuristic. 
c  Opt: optimal; Sub: suboptimal. 
d  C: conventional only; P: considers PMU. 
e  SE: SE level; It: iteration level. 
 
 
3.3 The Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers 
ADMM is a simple but powerful distributed convex optimization algorithm that 
has many applications in large-scale distributed computing and optimization. It blends the 
benefits of two predecessor algorithms, dual decomposition and augmented Lagrangian 
methods for convex optimization, and is either equivalent or closely related to many other 
similar optimization algorithms. It displays the decomposability of dual ascent and the 
superior convergence properties of the method of multipliers. It was first introduced in the 
1970s, and by the mid-1990s, the theory had been mostly established. Although the focus 
of the algorithm is on distributed computing, the algorithm can also be used serially, 
where even with no tuning it is competitive with the best known methods for some 
problems. The main reference for this section on ADMM is [41]. 
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3.3.1 General ADMM Algorithm 
In ADMM, the variables 𝑥 and 𝑧 are updated in an alternating (sequential) manner, 
giving the algorithm its name. The ADMM problem formulation is as follows. Consider 
the problem of minimizing a global objective function that takes the form 
 
min 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑔(𝑧) 
subject to 𝐴𝑥 + 𝐵𝑧 = 𝑐 
(79) 
where variables 𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑛 and 𝑧 ∈ ℝ𝑚, 𝐴 ∈ ℝ𝑝×𝑛, 𝐵 ∈ ℝ𝑝×𝑚, and 𝑐 ∈ ℝ𝑝. The functions 𝑓 
and 𝑔 are assumed to be closed, proper, and convex. The unaugmented Lagrangian 𝐿0 is 
assumed to have a saddle point, i.e. 𝐿0(𝑥
∗, 𝑧∗, 𝑦) ≤  𝐿0(𝑥
∗, 𝑧∗, 𝑦∗) ≤  𝐿0(𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑦
∗) 
∀ 𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑦. Like in the method of multipliers, the augmented Lagrangian is 
 𝐿𝑝(𝑥, 𝑧, 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑔(𝑧) + 𝑦
𝑇(𝐴𝑥 + 𝐵𝑧 − 𝑐) +
𝜌
2
‖𝐴𝑥 + 𝐵𝑧 − 𝑐‖2
2. (80) 










(𝑘+1), 𝑧, 𝑦(𝑘)) (82) 
 𝑦(𝑘+1) = 𝑦(𝑘) + 𝜌(𝐴𝑥(𝑘+1) + 𝐵𝑧(𝑘+1) − 𝑐) (83) 
where 𝜌 > 0 and (𝑘) indicates the 𝑘-th interation. The first ADMM equation is the 𝑥-
minimization step, the second equation is the 𝑧-minization step, and the third equation is 
the dual variable update.  
 The algorithm can also be written in a scaled form. The scaled dual variable 𝑢 is 
 𝑢 = (
1
𝜌
) 𝑦 (84) 
Using the expression for 𝑢, ADMM can be written as 




















 𝑢(𝑘+1) = 𝑢(𝑘) + 𝐴𝑥(𝑘+1) + 𝐵𝑧(𝑘+1) − 𝑐 (87) 
By defining the primal residual at iteration 𝑘 + 1 as 
 𝑟(𝑘+1) = 𝐴𝑥(𝑘+1) + 𝐵𝑧(𝑘+1) − 𝑐 (88) 
we see that 𝑢(𝑘) is related to the running sum of the residuals 




The dual residual at iteration 𝑘 + 1 is 
 𝑠(𝑘+1) = 𝜌𝐴𝑇𝐵(𝑧(𝑘+1) − 𝑧𝑘) (90) 
ADMM can be considered as a special version of the method of multipliers where 
a single Gauss-Seidel pass over the variables 𝑥 and 𝑧 is used instead of the usual joint 
minimization step. Separating the minimization over the variables into two steps is what 
allows for decomposition when 𝑓 or 𝑔 are separable. 
3.3.2 Convergence Properties and Stopping Criteria 
In theory, ADMM displays the following convergence properties: 
• Residual convergence 
o The iterates approach feasibility 
o 𝑟(𝑘) → 0 as 𝑘 → ∞ 
o 𝑠(𝑘) → 0 as 𝑘 → ∞ 
• Objective convergence 
o The objective function approaches optimal value 
o 𝑓(𝑥(𝑘)) + 𝑔(𝑧(𝑘)) → 𝑝∗ as 𝑘 → ∞ 
• Dual variable convergence 
o The dual variable approaches a dual optimal point 
o 𝑦(𝑘) → 𝑦∗ as 𝑘 → ∞ 
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In practice, ADMM can be slow to converge to high accuracy. However, it often 
converges to a modest level of accuracy that is sufficient for many applications within a 
few tens of iterations. The relatively slower convergence of ADMM distinguishes it from 
algorithms like Newton’s method, where high accuracy can be obtained in only a few 
iterations. 
A reasonable stopping criterion is that both the primal and dual residuals are 
sufficiently small, i.e. 
 ‖𝑟(𝑘)‖
2
≤ 𝜖𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 and ‖𝑠(𝑘)‖
2
≤ 𝜖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 (91) 
where 𝜖𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 > 0 and 𝜖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 > 0. For example, these tolerances could be chosen as 
follows using an absolute and relative 𝜖 




, ‖𝑐‖2} (92) 
 𝜖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 = √𝑛𝜖𝑎𝑏𝑠 + 𝜖𝑟𝑒𝑙‖𝐴𝑇𝑦(𝑘)‖
2
 (93) 
where 𝜖𝑎𝑏𝑠 > 0 is an absolute tolerance, 𝜖𝑟𝑒𝑙 > 0 is a relative tolerance such as 10−3, 𝑝 
and 𝑛 are the dimensions of the vectors from Section 3.3.1. 
3.3.3 Consensus ADMM Algorithm 
The consensus problem is the problem in which multiple agents need to put forth 
candidate values, communicate with one another, and come to agree on a single consensus 
value. ADMM-based methods are useful for solving the consensus problem using 
distributed optimization.  The goal is to solve the global problem in such a way that each 
sub-problem can be handled by its own thread or processor. 
The problem formulation for consensus ADMM is as follows. Consider the 
problem of minimizing a global objective function that is decomposable into N parts: 
 min 𝑓(𝑥) = ∑ 𝑓𝑖(𝑥)
𝑁
𝑖=1 , (94) 
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where 𝑥 ∈ ℝ𝑛 and each smaller objective function 𝑓𝑖 is convex. Under these conditions, 
the original problem can be reformulated in terms of local variables 𝑥𝑖 ∈ ℝ
𝑛 and a 
common global variable 𝑐: 
 min ∑ 𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1  s.t. 𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐 = 0 (95) 
for 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁. By introducing these local variables with the constraint that shared local 
variables should agree, it is possible to split 𝑓𝑖(𝑥) into separate objective functions 𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖). 
Then the augmented Lagrangian is: 
 𝐿𝑝(𝑥1:𝑁, 𝑧, 𝑦) = ∑ (𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖) + 𝑦𝑖




𝑖=1 ‖𝑥𝑖 − 𝑐‖2
2), (96) 
where 𝑦 is the dual variable and 𝜌 > 0 is the penalty factor. By defining 𝑐 as ?̅? (the 






















(𝑘+1) − ?̅?(𝑘+1)) (98) 
For consensus ADMM, the primal and dual residuals are 
 𝑟(𝑘) = (𝑥1
(𝑘) − ?̅?(𝑘), … , 𝑥𝑁
(𝑘) − ?̅?(𝑘)) (99) 
 𝑠(𝑘) = −𝜌(?̅?(𝑘) − ?̅?(𝑘−1), … , ?̅?(𝑘) − ?̅?(𝑘−1)) (100) 
The stopping conditions are ‖𝑟(𝑘)‖
2
≤ 𝜖𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑦 and ‖𝑠(𝑘)‖
2













= √𝑁𝜌2‖?̅?(𝑘) − ?̅?(𝑘−1)‖2
2 (102) 
3.3.4 Application to State Estimation 
Performing state estimation with nonlinear ℎ(𝑥) functions involves solving 
nonconvex optimization problems. As discussed in Section 2.2.1, currently AC state 
estimation relies on the Gauss-Newton method, a modification of Newton’s method that 
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is used to solve nonlinear least squares problems. Typically these models are iteratively 
linearized via the Gauss-Newton method or using the DC approximation discussed in 
Section 2.2.5 [36]. Convergence is not guaranteed, not even local convergence as in 
Newton’s method, and the method is sensitive to the initial guess. 
When ADMM is applied directly to a nonconvex problem, it may not converge, 
and even if it does converge, it may not converge to an optimal point. It must be 
considered as simply another local optimization method. The hope is that it might 
possibly have better convergence properties than other local optimization methods in 
terms of faster convergence or convergence to a point with a better objective value. 
Depending on the initial values of the variables 𝑥(0) and 𝑦(0) and the parameter 𝜌, 
ADMM can converge to different and sometimes non-optimal points. 
3.4 Slack Bus Referencing 
In centralized state estimation, the calculated states are referenced to the system 
slack bus (an arbitrarily chosen reference bus). In decentralized state estimation, the 
solution for each sub-area or sub-problem is referenced to its own slack bus, rather than 
the global slack bus. Hence, before we integrate the solutions for the different sub-areas 
or sub-problems, we must first reference them all back to the global slack bus. There are 
two main ways to achieve this outcome. 
The simplest and most accurate method is only possible if phasor measurement 
units are installed. For multi-area state estimation (solving the joint state estimation 
problem for several control areas), each sub-area must contain at least one phasor 
measurement unit. In that scenario, a bus whose phase is measured by a PMU will be 
selected as the slack bus for that sub-area. Because PMUs use a synchronized GPS clock, 
measurements gathered from different sub-areas are synchronized to the same time (as 
opposed to SCADA measurements which are received by the control center 
asynchronously). Alternately, for distributed state estimation (solving the state estimation 
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problem for a single control area), the global problem should be partitioned such that 
each sub-problem contains at least one independent PMU measurement. This in effect 
would limit the maximum number of possible sub-problems, which would be equal to the 
number of installed PMUs. The exact methodology for including PMU measurements in 
the state estimation formulation is discussed in Section 3.6.3. 
If phasor measurements are not available, then the second method must be used 
instead. It is not as accurate as the PMU-based method, but it is still useful because it 
enables decomposition-based state estimation in the absence of PMU installation. The 
second method only requires that SCADA measurements be available. Although SCADA 
measurements are not actually synchronized, we can assume that they are collected at 
approximately the same time, because the dynamics of the power grid are relatively slow-
moving in general. (However, this assumption no longer holds true during a transient 
power system event, such as a transmission line fault.) This assumption is typical for 
traditional state estimation, which only includes SCADA measurements. The exact 
methodology is discussed in Section 3.5.3. 
3.5 Fast Decomposition-Based State Estimation 
Fast decomposition-based SE uses automatic graph partitioning to decompose the 
global WLS SE problem into N smaller problems. This reduces the order of the SE 
problem, which in turn increases the computational speed. There are three main steps in 
the algorithm. The first is determining how to divide (partition) the global SE problem into 
𝑁 smaller sub-problems. The second is solving the sub-problems in unison with consensus 
ADMM at each iteration. The last step is reintegrating the sub-problem solutions to obtain 
the global solution. The overall execution flow is shown in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12. Fast decomposition-based SE algorithm flowchart 
 
3.5.1 Automatic Graph Partitioning 
The computational time required for SE increases nonlinearly with the size of the 
problem, which is determined by the number of estimated states and measurements. 
Hence, we want to decompose the global SE problem into a series of smaller problems, 
thus reducing the problem size and improving the overall speed. The most intuitive 
approach for decomposition is to virtually partition the power system into N sub-areas and 
then assign the appropriate subset of the global measurements to each sub-problem. 
Because a power system is essentially an undirected graph composed of vertices (buses) 
and edges (lines), this decomposition can be considered as a graph partitioning problem. 
Small partitioning problems can be solved by hand empirically, but large graphs 
are cumbersome to partition manually, especially when certain partition properties are 
desirable. Hence, there arose the need for automatic graph partitioning methods. Existing 
partitioning methods can divide a graph into N partitions with a roughly equal number of 
vertices, where the vertices in each partition are contiguous, while simultaneously 
reducing the number of edges that traverse the partitions [42]. 
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For this work, there are three desirable properties for how the global SE problem is 
partitioned. First, the number of buses in each partition should be roughly balanced, so 
that the number of estimated states in each SE sub-problem is approximately equal. For a 
serial implementation, this will improve the overall SE solution time since it is the sum of 
the sub-problem solution times. Unbalanced partitioning would result in 
disproportionately longer times for larger partitions, which increases the solution time. 
Secondly, the number of virtual tie lines (lines that traverse partitions) should be as 
few as possible. This is due to the way that decomposition-based SE is formulated. In 
order for partitions to reach consensus about the global system state using ADMM, the 
state vectors for each sub-problem must include the sub-area’s perceptions of the angle 
and voltage for at least one bus in the neighboring sub-areas. Because adding more virtual 
tie lines adds more estimated states to the sub-problems which increases the computation 
time, we want to keep the number of virtual tie lines to a minimum. 
The third desirable property is the physical contiguity of the buses in each 
partition. This is to ensure the observability of each sub-area and serves to reduce the 
number of virtual tie lines. 
Since these properties match the objectives of existing graph partitioning methods, 
we used a standard graph partitioning toolbox METIS in this work to partition four IEEE 
test systems. METIS is a set of serial graph partitioning programs based on multi-level 
recursive bisection and k-way partitioning schemes [43]. Multi-level k-way produces 
higher quality results than recursive bisection but has issues enforcing contiguity when the 
desired number of partitions approaches the overall system size. For this work, when the 
desired number of partitions is less than half the number of buses in the test case, multi-
level k-way was selected as the partitioning scheme. Else recursive bisection was selected. 
The output of METIS is an assignment list that describes which buses belong in 
each partition. From those results, virtual tie lines are automatically identified. Then the 
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measurements for each sub-problem are automatically assigned from the set of global 
measurements. 
The time it takes to partition a power system is negligible compared to the time it 
takes to perform state estimation. For example, METIS can partition graphs with millions 
of vertices into hundreds of parts in only a few seconds on current generation workstations 
and PCs [44]. Most power systems are smaller graphs, on the order of tens of thousands of 
vertices, so the partitioning time will be even faster.  
3.5.2 Problem Formulation 
Using the partitioning results, the global SE problem can be decomposed into a 
series of smaller problems. However, to solve them in unison, the original WLS problem 
(introduced in Section 2.2) needs to be reformulated to include consensus ADMM. The 
global objective function that we want to minimize in (1) can be rewritten as a series of 
smaller problems with local 𝑥𝑖 state vectors:  
 𝑓𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = [𝑧𝑖 − ℎ𝑖(𝑥𝑖)]
𝑇𝑅𝑖
−1[𝑧𝑖 − ℎ(𝑥𝑖)], (103) 
where 𝑖 denotes the local quantity of the WLS SE problem, subject to the constraint that 
shared 𝑥𝑖 states must agree. By combining (103) with the right hand side of (97), we 
obtain an expression for the new local objective function 𝐽𝑖. Taking the partial derivative 
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By setting 𝑔𝑖(𝑥𝑖) to zero and using the Gauss-Newton method to expand its Taylor 
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3.5.3 Slack Bus Angle Referencing Using SCADA Measurements 
In this work, we assume that only SCADA measurements are available to the state 
estimator. As discussed in Section 3.43.4, the solution of each local state estimation 
problem is referenced to a local slack bus. In order to integrate the local solutions into the 
global solution, all states must be referenced to the same global slack bus. The objective 
is to use SCADA measurements from opposite ends of the tie-lines to estimate the angle 
difference between pairs of neighboring areas. 
A small illustrative example is shown in Figure 13. Assume a given power system 
is divided into four different areas. Assume the global slack bus angle is 𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 in Area 1. 
The state estimation problem for Area 1 is solved simultaneously as the state estimation 
problems for Areas 2, 3, and 4. After solving the state estimation problems, all of the 
calculated bus angles in Area 1 are relative to 𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓, which is set arbitrarily to 0 for 
simplicity. Similarly the bus angles in Areas 2, 3, and 4 are referenced to 𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓, 𝜃3,𝑟𝑒𝑓, 
and 𝜃4,𝑟𝑒𝑓 respectively, each of which is also set arbitrarily to 0. The objective is to 
reference the bus angles in Areas 2, 3, and 4 to the global reference angle 𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓. In other 
words, we want to find Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓), Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃3,𝑟𝑒𝑓), and Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃4,𝑟𝑒𝑓). 
In our example, Areas 1 and 2 are connected by line 𝐴, Areas 2 and 3 are 
connected by line 𝐵, and Areas 2 and 4 are connected by line 𝐶. We can estimate 
Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓) by assuming that both Area 1 and Area 2 have access to SCADA line 
flow measurements across line 𝐴 (i.e. Area 1 and Area 2 overlap by at least one bus). 
Extend the bus voltage state vector for Area 1 to include the state 𝜃2,𝐴(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎1), where 
𝜃2,𝐴(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎1) denotes Area 1’s estimated value of the bus angle 𝜃2,𝐴. Extend the bus voltage 
state vector for Area 2 to include the state 𝜃1,𝐴(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎2), where 𝜃2,𝐴(𝐴𝑟𝑒𝑎1) denotes Area 2’s 
estimated value of the bus angle 𝜃1,𝐴. Then Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓) can be estimated as 
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Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓) ≅
1
2




Figure 13. Slack referencing using only SCADA measurements for 4 areas 
 
However, while it is possible to estimate Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓), it is not possible to 
directly estimate Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃3,𝑟𝑒𝑓) and Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃4,𝑟𝑒𝑓) since Area 1 does not share 
any tie lines with Areas 3 and 4. Instead we have to estimate Δ(𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃3,𝑟𝑒𝑓) and 
Δ(𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃4,𝑟𝑒𝑓) first, using the same method we used to estimate Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓). 
Then we can effectively obtain 
 Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃3,𝑟𝑒𝑓) ≅ Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓) + Δ(𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃3,𝑟𝑒𝑓) (109) 
 Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃4,𝑟𝑒𝑓) ≅ Δ(𝜃1,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓) + Δ(𝜃2,𝑟𝑒𝑓 − 𝜃4,𝑟𝑒𝑓) (110) 
Another way to visualize this idea is to consider the areas as a tree data structure 
(illustrated in Figure 14). In our example, Area 1 is the root of the tree, because it 
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contains the global slack bus. Area 1 has one child, Area 2. Area 2 has two children, Area 
3 and Area 4. 
 
Figure 14. Tree representation of slack referencing for 4-area example 
 
 In a hierarchical state estimator architecture, the central coordinator would have 
access to a tree of how each sub-area or sub-problem is connected to the global slack area 
(the area containing the global slack bus). Using that tree, they can reference the states 
for each sub-area or sub-problem to the parent area until they reach the global slack area. 
Once slack referencing is complete, we can move onto solution integration. 
3.5.4 Solution Integration 
After the solutions for all sub-problems are referenced to the same global reference 
bus using the approach described in the previous section, the ADMM averaging step 
integrates the separate sub-problem solutions into the global SE solution. States that are 
not shared between sub-problems are taken directly from the solution of their respective 










3.5.5 Simulation Results 
The fast decomposition-based SE algorithm was implemented serially on a single 
processor and tested on the IEEE 14 bus, 57 bus, 118 bus, and 300 bus systems. We made 
an assumption that there are a sufficient number of measurements in the system that 
observability is ensured even at the finest granularity of partitioning (a single bus). 
Practical applications would not use such high granularity, but this assumption was 
necessary to illustrate the full computational trend. Hence the measurements for each 
system were automatically generated from their power flow results at a global redundancy 
ratio, defined as the number of measurements divided by the number of estimated states, 
of approximately 2.9. Then each power flow value was perturbed by a randomly generated 
Gaussian error with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.01, which represents a 
measurement error standard deviation of 1%. Since the measurements are based on the 
power flow results, the true state is known for our simulated systems. Hence, the accuracy 
of each SE approach can be quantified using the absolute error between the estimated 
power system state and the true state. 
Timing tests for decomposition-based SE were carried out with different numbers 
of partitions, ranging from two partitions to fully decomposed (where every partition 
contains a single bus). These times were compared against the respective time for central 
WLS SE. To ensure a fair comparison, the core implementation of decomposition-based 
SE was similar to that of central WLS SE with necessary changes added to support 
ADMM, as described in Section 3.1.3. Also, the same convergence criteria of < 10-4 
was used for both SE approaches. All times shown are averaged across 10 runs. The 
timing was performed using the tic toc function in MATLAB R2014b on a 64-bit 
workstation that has a 2.80 GHz Intel Xeon W3530 CPU and 6 GB of installed RAM. 
Using METIS, the IEEE 14 bus system was partitioned into 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 
14 sub-areas. The IEEE 57 bus system was partitioned into 2, 4, 8, 16, 24, 32, 44, and 57 
sub-areas. The IEEE 118 bus system was partitioned into 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 48, 64, 88, and 
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118 sub-areas. The IEEE 300 bus system was partitioned into 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 62, 113, 200, 
and 300 sub-areas. The ADMM penalty factor 𝜌 was set to 1. 
3.5.5.1 Computational Speed 
The aggregate timing results for decomposition-based SE and central WLS SE 
(represented as a single partition) are shown in Figure 15. Among the tested number of 
partitions, the fastest average decomposition-based SE time for the IEEE 14 bus system 
was for 2 partitions, each containing 7 buses. For the IEEE 57 bus system, the fastest 
decomposition-based SE time was for 4 partitions. Of the 4 partitions, 2 sub-areas 
contained 15 buses each, 1 sub-area contained 14 buses, and 1 sub-area contained 13 
buses. For the IEEE 118 bus system, the fastest time was for 8 partitions. Of the 8 
partitions, 6 sub-areas contained 15 buses each, and 2 sub-areas contained 14 buses each. 
For the IEEE 300 bus system, the fastest time was for 32 partitions. Of the 32 partitions, 
16 sub-areas contained 9 buses each, 11 sub-areas contained 10 buses each, 2 sub-areas 
contained 11 buses, one sub-area contained only 6 buses, and one contained only 4 buses. 
The best case speedup factors, defined as the central SE computation time divided 
by the fastest decomposition-based SE time, for the 4 test systems ranged from 1.293 to 
7.892, as shown in Figure 16. For the considered systems, larger best case speedups were 
observed for larger systems. Empirical results suggest that initially increasing the number 
of partitions decreases the computational time for decomposition-based SE. By 
partitioning the global SE problem into smaller problems, we reduce the size of each SE 
problem, and hence a decrease in overall time is observed for a serial implementation. As 
the number of partitions grows, we begin to observe an increase in the computation time 
of decomposition-based SE. This is due to an increase in the number of virtual tie line 
measurements in each local SE problem, which adds more states that need to be 
estimated. In the case of the 14 bus case, this caused the overall SE computation time for 
12 and 14 partitions to exceed the global SE time. However, this is an effect seen only in 
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very small systems. It is important to note that for the three larger systems, 
decomposition-based WLS SE is always faster than central WLS SE regardless of the 
number of partitions, even for a serial implementation. Because large SE problems can 
always be automatically broken into smaller SE problems that are then solved, the 
decomposition-based SE is very scalable. 
 
Figure 15. Timing results for 4 standard IEEE test systems 
 
 




The emphasis of this work is on computational speed, so the discussion of 
accuracy is focused around the fastest case for each test system. A comparison of the 
solution accuracy for bus voltages is shown in Figure 17 for both central and 
decomposition-based SE. A similar comparison of the accuracy for bus angles is 
presented in Figure 18. 
For both central and decomposition-based SE, the average absolute errors for 
voltage magnitudes and angles are on the order of 10-3. Because nominal voltage 
magnitudes are 1 per unit while nominal angles are 0 radians, this level of error has a 
bigger relative impact on angles than voltage magnitudes. However, since the absolute 
error is small, it will have a negligible impact on most buses. 
In general, the solution accuracy of decomposition-based SE is comparable to that 
of central SE but slightly worse. This is to be expected since each sub-problem receives 
only a subset of the global measurements. This slight loss in solution accuracy is 
acceptable when computational speed is of the utmost importance. For example, 
decomposition-based SE could be used to solve larger problems in real time that are 
currently intractable for central SE. 
 
Figure 17. Average voltage magnitude errors for 4 standard IEEE test systems 
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Figure 18. Average angle errors for 4 standard IEEE test systems 
 
3.5.5.3 Implications for Larger Systems 
Empirical results suggest that the best case speedup factor sf increases with the 
number of buses n. If we assume a linear relationship between the speedup factor and the 
system size, we can extrapolate that sf = 0.0228n+0.9269, as visualized in Figure 19. 
This extrapolated relationship suggests that the proposed decomposition-based SE 
approach has the potential to greatly increase the speed of SE for real power systems. 
 
Figure 19. Potential speedup for larger systems 
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3.5.6 Observability and Bad Data Detection 
Observability of each partition is a necessary condition for decomposition-based 
SE. If one or more partitions are unobservable, estimates for some states may be 
unobtainable by decomposition-based SE, even though centralized SE may be able to 
estimate them. This situation tends to arise when the following conditions are true: a) the 
partition is very small, b) it has few measurements relative to the number of states, and c) 
there are insufficient measurements at the partition boundary to make the states 
observable. Mechanisms to merge neighboring partitions with the unobservable partitions 
could be implemented to regain observability. 
Because decomposition-based SE is built on the WLS estimation method, BDD 
and correction can occur after the estimation process. Since we implemented 
decomposition-based SE serially and in a central manner, BDD could also be performed 
in a central manner after obtaining the final joint SE result, using the largest normalized 
residual test. If it is desirable that BDD be performed in a decentralized way, the method 
of [36] could be applied. 
3.5.7 Conclusions 
This work used automatic graph partitioning to enable a scalable decomposition-
based SE approach. Empirical results suggest that decomposition reduces computation 
time even for a serial implementation, except for very small cases. This implies that any 
SE problem should be decomposed beyond its physical boundaries. With the speed gains, 
decomposition-based SE could be used to process a greater number of measurements than 
is currently tractable for central SE. 
3.6 Improving Solution Accuracy 
If the accuracy of the state estimator solution is of the utmost importance as 
opposed to computational speed, the methodology proposed in this section is more 
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suitable. The work presented in this section differs from the work presented in Section 
3.5 in the following ways: 
• The focus of the work presented in this section is primarily empirical analysis 
of the effect of partitioning on computational accuracy, whereas the focus of 
the work presented in Section 3.5 was primarily empirical analysis of the 
effect of partitioning on computational speed. 
• Automatic graph partitioning methods were applied to the power system 
measurement graph in this work, whereas they were applied to the power 
system topology graph in Section 3.5. 
• The problem formulation presented in this section uses convex relaxation of 
AC state estimation via semidefinite programming. This approach is best if 
solution accuracy is prioritized over speed. The semidefinite problem could be 
solved in MATLAB using CVX and SeDuMi. The work in Section 3.5 was 
based on a DC SE approximation, which did not require the use of any 
optimization programs. 
• The slack referencing would be more accurate with the availability of both 
PMU and SCADA measurements, whereas the slack bus referencing method 
described in Section 3.5.3 assumes the availability of only SCADA 
measurements.  
• The algorithm presented in this section is fully distributed, whereas the 
algorithm from Section 3.5 relies on a hierarchical SE architecture. 
3.6.1 Automatic Measurement Graph Partitioning 
The power system measurement graph is always a subset of the power system 
topology graph. Because it is prohibitively expensive to meter every single component in 
a power system (i.e. every transmission line, bus, transformer, etc.), the typical 
redundancy ratio (which is the number of measurements divided by the number of 
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estimated quantities) of realistic power systems is around 1.5-2.0. In our previous work, 
we assumed a redundancy ratio of 3.0 so that we could achieve very fine partitioning 
granularity to test large numbers of subproblems. Hence there was no difference between 
partitioning the power system topology graph and the measurement graph. However, 
when full measurements are not available, the partitioning results would be different. The 
main change is the input to the METIS software tool, which would be a smaller graph 
whose edges and vertices are created based on available measurements. The rest of the 
process remains identical to Section 3.5.1.  
3.6.2 Convex Relaxation of AC State Estimation Using Semidefinite Programming 
To guarantee ADMM convergence for the nonconvex and nonlinear AC state 
estimation problem, the problem first needs to undergo relaxation. There are two main 
ways of achieving this goal. The first class of methods is second-order cone program 
(SOCP) relaxation, which has been applied to the AC optimal power flow problem. The 
second class is semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation, which has been applied to 
the AC state estimation problem. SOCPs are nonlinear convex problems, which includes 
linear programs, convex quadratic programs, and quadratically constrained convex 
quadratic programs. SDP includes SOCP as a special case. Although SOCPs can be 
expressed as SDPs, solving them via an SDP method is not a good idea, because interior-
point methods that directly solve the SOCP have a much better complexity than an SDP 
method under the worst case scenario [45], [46]. A review of the relevant papers that 
focus on convex relaxation of the AC state estimation problem is presented in Table 4. 
Most of the research literature has focused on SDP rather than SOCP. Several papers also 
discussed using distributed methods to help reduce the computational complexity of SDP.  
 
Table 4. AC State Estimation Convex Relaxation Literature Review 
Year Author Description Method? DSE? 




static state estimation, 




Weng et al. 
[51]–[54] 
SDP problem formulation for 
static state estimation, 
distributed optimization using 
Lagrangian dual decomposition 
SDP Lagrangian 
2014 
Kim et al. [55], 
[56] 
SDP problem formulation for 
online static state estimation 
(does not use dynamic 
equations like extended 
Kalman filter) 
SDP No 
2015 Kim [57] 
SDP problem formulation for 
online static state estimation, 




Zheng et al. 
[58] 
Bilinear state estimation (two-
stage change of variables), not 
mathematically equivalent to 
Gauss-Newton but provides 
similar results in practice 
Bilinear ADMM 
2017 
Zhang et al. 
[59] 
Penalized SDP and SOCP 
problem formulations for both 





SOCP problem formulation for 
WLAV estimator, SDP cutting 




According to [50] and [57], the convex relaxation of AC state estimation is solved 
as follows. Recall the AC state estimation problem formulation from Section 2.2. Let 𝑌 





−𝑦𝑚𝑛 if (𝑚, 𝑛) ∈ ℇ
?̅?𝑛𝑛 + ∑ 𝑦𝑛𝑣
𝑣∈𝑁𝑛
 if 𝑚 = 𝑛
0 else
 (112) 
where ℇ is the set of transmission lines, 𝑦𝑚𝑛 is the line admittance between bus 𝑚 and bus 
𝑛, ?̅?𝑛𝑛 is the shunt admittance for bus 𝑛, and 𝑁𝑛 is the set of buses connected to bus 𝑛 via 
transmission lines. 
Let us express each quadratic measurement in 𝑧 in terms of the outer-product 
matrix of 𝑉 = 𝑣𝑣𝐻. Define the new admittance matrices as 
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 𝑌𝑛 = 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑛
𝑇𝑌 (113) 
























𝐻 ) (118) 
 𝐻𝑣,𝑛 = 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑛
𝑇 (119) 
Then the quadratic measurement model can be expressed linearly with respect to 𝑉 ∈
ℂ𝑁×𝑁 as 
 𝑃𝑛 = 𝑇𝑟(𝐻𝑃,𝑛𝑉) (120) 
 𝑄𝑛 = 𝑇𝑟(𝐻𝑄,𝑛𝑉) (121) 
 𝑃𝑚𝑛 = 𝑇𝑟(𝐻𝑃,𝑚𝑛𝑉) (122) 
 𝑄𝑚𝑛 = 𝑇𝑟(𝐻𝑄,𝑚𝑛𝑉) (123) 
 |𝑉𝑛|
2 = 𝑇𝑟(𝐻𝑉,𝑛𝑉) (124) 
Then the new AC state estimation problem formulation becomes  
 min
𝑉









2 . At this point, this formulation is still nonconvex, because the cost 
function in (125) has a degree of 4 with respect to the entries of 𝑉, and the rank constraint 
in (126) is nonconvex. Using the Schur complement, (125) and (126) can be rewritten in a 
linear form using an auxiliary vector χ ∈ ℝ𝑀. 
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 s. t. 𝑉 ≥ 0 and  (128) 
 rank(𝑉) = 1 (129) 
 [
−χ𝑚 𝑧𝑚 − 𝑇𝑟(𝐻𝑚𝑉)
𝑧𝑚 − 𝑇𝑟(𝐻𝑚𝑉) −1
] ≤ 0  ∀ 𝑚 (130) 
In this new formulation, only the rank constraint is still nonconvex. By relaxing 
(dropping) this constraint via SDP, we arrive at the final problem formulation, which 
consists of (127), (128), and (130). This convex relaxation has a worst-case computational 
complexity of 𝑂 (𝑀4√𝑁 log (
1
𝜖
)), where 𝜖 represents a given solution accuracy. The 
computational burden of the algorithm motivates the need for a distributed 
implementation, such as ADMM. 







where = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(?̂?) , the eigenvalues 𝜆1 ≥ 𝜆2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝜆𝑟 > 0 are positively ordered, and 
their corresponding eigenvectors are denoted as 𝑢1, 𝑢2, … , 𝑢𝑟. Because the best rank-one 
approximation for ?̂? is 𝜆1𝑢1𝑢1
𝐻,  we can choose the state estimate to be 𝑣 = √𝜆1𝑢1 . 
3.6.3 Slack Bus Angle Referencing Using PMU Measurements 
As discussed in Section 3.4, there are two different methods for slack bus 
referencing. The approach described in this section is more accurate than the approach 
described in Section 3.5.3, but it relies on the availability of PMU measurements (i.e. 
both PMU and SCADA measurements are inputs to the state estimator). PMU 
measurements have several advantages over traditional SCADA measurements. First of 
all, they are synchronous, unlike SCADA measurements which are asynchronous. Also, 
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PMU measurements are linear functions of the bus voltage state vector, unlike SCADA 
measurements which are nonlinear functions of the state in AC WLS state estimation (as 
discussed in Section 2.2). To incorporate PMU measurements, the convex relaxed 
problem formulation from Section 3.6.2 needs to be expanded as follows. 
Let 𝐵𝑃𝑀𝑈 denote the set of buses that have an installed PMU. Let 𝑧𝑃𝑀𝑈 =
𝐻𝑃𝑀𝑈𝑣 + 𝑒𝑃𝑀𝑈, where 𝑧𝑃𝑀𝑈 is the vector of PMU measurements, 𝐻𝑃𝑀𝑈 is the PMU 
measurement matrix, and 𝑒𝑃𝑀𝑈 is the vector of PMU measurement noise. Each PMU 
measurement error is assumed to be independent of the SCADA measurement errors and 
Gaussian with a mean of 0 and a variance of 𝜎𝑠
2.  
In polar coordinates, the expression for 𝐻𝑃𝑀𝑈 is very straightforward but does not 
capture useful line current information. In rectangular coordinates, this information can 



















𝑇 is the 𝑠-th row of the identity matrix, 𝑌𝑓𝑙 ∈ ℂ
2𝑁𝑙×𝑁𝑏 is the line-to-bus admittance 
matrix (𝑁𝑙 is the number of lines and 𝑁𝑏 is the number of buses), and 𝑆𝑛 is the binary 
𝐿𝑛 × 2𝑁𝑙 matrix that selects rows of 𝑌𝑓𝑙 such that they correspond to the lines connected 
to bus 𝑠. 
When we include PMUs, the augmented WLS cost becomes  
 min
𝑉











2  ∀ 𝑠 ∈ 𝐵𝑃𝑀𝑈, 𝑧𝑠 is the PMU measurement at bus 𝑠, and 𝐻𝑠 is the PMU 
measurement matrix corresponding to 𝑧𝑠. Because of the legacy SCADA measurements, 
this augmented problem is also nonconvex. Hence we use convex relaxation again to 
obtain 
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 {?̂?, ?̂?} = argmin
𝑋,𝑉,𝑣,𝜒





 s. t. 𝑋 = [
𝑉 𝑣
𝑣𝐻 1
] ≥ 0 and  (135) 
 rank(𝑋) = 1 (136) 
 [
−χ𝑚 𝑧𝑚 − 𝑇𝑟(𝐻𝑚𝑉)
𝑧𝑚 − 𝑇𝑟(𝐻𝑚𝑉) −1
] ≤ 0  ∀ 𝑚 (137) 
After solving the optimization problem for each sub-area, to set the corresponding 




, where 𝑉𝑟𝑒𝑓 
is the complex bus voltage for each local slack bus. Then we can apply the same slack bus 
referencing method described in Section 3.5.3, but using the more accurate states 
estimated from hybrid PMU and SCADA measurements. 
3.6.4 ADMM-Based AC State Estimation 
Partition the global state estimation problem into multiple areas (in the literature, 
the boundaries are established by control area or arbitrarily for computational purposes), 
and reformulate the problem such that it can be solved using a distributed optimization 













 s. t.  𝑊𝑘 ≥ 0, ∀𝑘,𝑊𝑘
𝑗
= 𝑊𝑗
𝑘, ∀𝑘, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑘  (140) 
where 𝑣𝑘 is the voltage vector for area 𝑘, 𝑊𝑘 = 𝑣𝑘𝑣𝑘
𝐻, 𝑀𝑘 is the number of measurements 
included in area 𝑘, 𝑧𝑘
𝑙  is each measurement included in area 𝑘, and 𝐻𝑘
𝑙  is the subset of 
rows and columns from 𝐻 in Section 3.6.2 corresponding to buses in area 𝑘. For 
neighboring areas 𝑘 and 𝑗, let 𝑆𝑗𝑘 denote their shared buses. Then 𝑊𝑘
𝑗
 is the submatrix of 
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𝑊𝑘 that contains the rows and columns corresponding to 𝑆𝑗𝑘, and 𝑊𝑗
𝑘 is the submatrix of 




𝑘 forces the voltages of the shared buses to be the same. An equivalent 
problem statement for each area is 





 s. t.  𝑅𝑒(𝑊𝑘
𝑗
) = 𝑅𝑘𝑗, ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑘 , ∀𝑘 (142) 
 𝐼𝑚(𝑊𝑘
𝑗
) = 𝐼𝑘𝑗 , ∀𝑗 ∈ 𝐴𝑘  , ∀𝑘 (143) 
where 𝑅𝑘𝑗 and 𝐼𝑘𝑗 are auxiliary matrices to handle the coupling constraints. The 
augmented Lagrangian function of (141) is  





























Then the steps for the resulting ADMM algorithm can be summarized as follows: 
Step 1 – Update 𝑾𝒌





























































]  (147) 


























]  (149) 
One way to recover the actual voltage estimate 𝑣 for each area 𝑘 from 𝑊𝑘 = 𝑣𝑘𝑣𝑘
𝐻 
is to use eigenvalue decomposition. Then 𝑊𝑘 = ∑ 𝜆𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑖
𝐻𝑟
𝑖=1 , where 𝑟 = 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘(𝑊𝑘), 𝜆1 ≥
𝜆2 ≥ ⋯ ≥ 𝜆𝑟 > 0 (the positive ordered eigenvalues), and 𝑢𝑖 are the eigenvectors. The 
state estimate can be chosen to be 𝑣(𝑢1) = √𝜆1𝑢1. 
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4 POWER SYSTEM CYBERSECURITY 
Chapter 4 provides background information on power system cybersecurity. 
Section 4.1 introduces cybersecurity as an emerging area of concern for the power 
industry. Section 4.2 describes the existing information and communication architecture 
of energy control centers and their vulnerabilities. Section 4.3 assesses the potential 
impact of a major cyber-attack on the power grid in terms of number of people impacted 
and economic damage. Section 4.4 provides an overview of relevant cyber-attacks in 
recent years. It covers both cyber-attacks on the electric grid that have succeeded in 
disrupting electricity service to customers as well as other cyber-attacks that have 
penetrated electric utility networks. Section 4.5 describes the response of the United 
States government and the American power system industry. Section 4.6 reviews specific 
power system applications that are particularly vulnerable to cyber-attacks as discussed in 
the research literature. 
4.1 Introduction 
Currently cybersecurity is a major challenge faced by governments and businesses 
around the world. In recent years, concerns have arisen that cyber-attacks launched by 
organizations with large amounts of resources at their disposal might choose to target 
critical infrastructure such as industrial control systems (ICS), which would be potentially 
devastating in terms of its personal and economic impact. The grid is one example of an 
ICS. The first well-known cyber-attack on an industrial control system occurred as early 
as 2000. However, in the power industry, cybersecurity is a relatively new concern 
arising in the past decade, although research on the subject has existed since the mid-
2000s. The literature has remained largely academic in nature since there have been few 
cyber-attacks on the electric grid to date that have succeeded in permanently damaging 
infrastructure or disrupt the service of electricity to end customers for long periods of 
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time. Due to the lack of historical information about grid cyber-attacks, the main focus of 
the existing literature has been on classifying different types of cyber-attacks, identifying 
general vulnerabilities in the control and operation of the grid, and formulating/detecting 
novel attacks.  
In the past, cyber-attacks on industrial control systems were carried out by 
disgruntled employees or as a means for financial extortion (such as ransomware), but 
increasingly they are cyber-weapons deployed by nation-states. The most sophisticated 
cyber-attacks require months to years of reconnaissance, planning, and coordination, 
which means they require the investment of massive amounts of resources that only 
nation-states can afford to provide. In recent years, there has been a rash of cyber-attacks 
that targeted utilities and energy companies in the United States, although none have 
succeeded to date in shutting off power to customers. These attacks have been linked to 
hostile foreign nation-states. The end goal of the attackers is unclear, but the focus thus 
far has been to gather information. The intent of these attacks could be to simply commit 
industrial espionage, or it could be more insidious, such as setting the stage for future 
cyber-attacks that aim to do major infrastructure damage. 
4.2 The Vulnerability of the Power Grid 
Electric utilities use real-time SCADA systems to monitor and control their assets. 
A typical SCADA architecture for an energy control center is shown in Figure 20. There 
are five main components. RTUs are field-based devices that are used to manage the flow 
of power at an electrical substation. Substations are typically located in remote areas and 
are unattended by humans. Programmable logic controllers (PLCs), intelligent electronic 
devices (IEDs), and relays are used to automate tasks at each substation. A control center 
with central computers manages the remote equipment at the substations and processes, 
analyzes, and archives the collected real-time information. A communication system is 
used to convey monitoring information from substations back to the control center as 
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well as send commands from the control center to the substations, using a communication 
protocol (such as DNP3, the predominant standard used in distribution substations in 
North America). In addition to substation communication, a control center may also 
communicate with its neighboring control centers to coordinate the transfer of power 
from one area to another. Finally there is a human-machine interface (HMI) at the control 
center that allows power system operators to supervise and manage the flow of power. It 
is important to emphasize that the SCADA network at an energy control center is 
typically isolated from the corporate network and the Internet via firewalls. Engineering 
and IT functions can connect to the corporate network but cannot directly control and 
operate the power grid. (However, as discussed in Section 4.4, it is possible to bridge this 
type of system protection.) 
These legacy SCADA systems were originally designed for safety and reliability. 
There is an implicit assumption of trust of all system components and communications, 
so these systems are vulnerable to the cyber-threat posed by malicious actors. As the 
connectivity between the Internet, different networks, and different systems increases, the 
power grid becomes increasingly susceptible to cyber-attacks. For example, generating 
turbines were once controlled and operated mechanically, but now they are mostly 
controlled by industrial control systems via remote automation. Also, grid modernization 
efforts to incorporate digital automation into protection, operation, and control have 
introduced more Internet protocol enabled points into the power system network, which 
further increases the likelihood of malicious intrusion. Furthermore, an increasing 
number of new vulnerabilities may be introduced into the SCADA system via system 
additions or integrations. Finally, greater requirements for sensitive data collection and 
exchange between parties such as utilities, coordinators, and customers create additional 
points-of-entry. For example, networks may be reconfigured to allow one-time access for 





Figure 20. SCADA architecture for the control center [63] 
 
Because the power grid is a mix of older legacy equipment and newer digital 
assets built over the span of decades, it is difficult to defend the entire system against 
cyber-attacks since there are so many potential vulnerabilities. Also, because substations 
are unmanned and geographically disbursed in remote locations, they need to be secured 
against physical threats. (Experts have noted that if a threat actor is able to physically 
access a substation, there is no limit to the amount of potential damage since malware can 
be introduced directly to devices, equipment can be physically destroyed, and relays can 
be manipulated [62].) Because a successful attack on the bulk generation and 
transmission systems would cause the most severe consequences, those should be the 
primary focus of power system cybersecurity research. Other essential grid functions that 
are at risk to cyber-attacks include: 
• Distribution systems 
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• Backup systems 
• Communication systems 
• Blackstart capability 
Some of these will be discussed in greater detail in Section 4.6. 
4.3 Potential Impacts of a Grid Cyber-Attack 
A 2015 joint report by Lloyd’s, a specialist insurance and reinsurance 
underwriting company, and the University of Cambridge’s Centre for Risk Studies [64] 
explored the implications of a simulated cyber-attack on the U.S. power grid in terms of 
potential economic impact and outage times. The scenario they created assumed a piece 
of malware was able to infect energy control centers in parts of the Northeast and seizes 
control of 50 generators (out of almost 700 generators in the region), forcing them to 
overload and burn out. This event had the potential to destabilize the Eastern 
Interconnection and trigger a blackout that impacts 93 million people. The estimated total 
impact to the US economy was $243B. 
While cyber-attacks have not yet caused widespread power outages in the United 
States, we can examine other major blackouts that have occurred in recent history to get 
another estimate of their potential impact. The infamous Northeast blackout of August 
2003 impacted approximately 50 million people and caused 100 deaths. (A satellite 
image of the event is shown in Figure 21.) The estimated economic damage was 
approximately $6B, and restoration took between 2 days and several weeks. Overall, this 
event led to 592M customer-hours of lost service [65]. In September 2017, Hurricane 
Maria devastated parts of Florida and the Caribbean. Puerto Rico was especially hard-hit 
since the storm passed directly overhead, wiping out most of their major infrastructure. 
This event is considered to be one of the longest power outages in human history (thus 
far) with 1248M+ customer-hours of lost service [65]. As of May 2018, there were still 
pockets of the island without electricity. 
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Figure 21. NOAA satellite image of the U.S. Northeast blackout in August 2003 [66] 
 
4.4 Significant Cyber-Attacks 
As of May 2018, there have only been two confirmed cyber-attacks on the power 
grid that have succeeded in disrupting the service of electricity. In recent years, there 
have been a number of other cyber-attacks on the grid (listed in Table 5) that, while they 
did not cause outages, did succeed in causing economic damage and/or the hacking of 
encrypted information, which could be used at a later date to launch more sophisticated 
attacks. 
 
Table 5. Incomplete List of Recent Attacks on the Power Grid 
Date Area Impacted 
Loss of 
Power? 
Brief Description and Impact 
03/2007 
Aurora Generator Test 
(Demonstration) [67] 
No 
Idaho National Labs demonstrated how a 
cyber-attack that rapidly opens/closes a diesel 
generator’s breakers out of phase can cause it 
to explode. 
04/2013 Pacific Gas & Electric No Snipers using rifles fired at the Metcalf 
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(US) [68] transmission substation in California, knocking 






(Ukraine) [7], [69] 
Yes 
Approximately 225,000 people lost power for 
up to 6 hours; control centers not fully 
functional even after 2 months. See Section 
4.4.2 for more details. 
12/2016 Ukrenergo (Ukraine) Yes 
One fifth of Kiev lost power for 1 hour. 
Possible large-scale test of new automated 
malware, using information gained from the 





Malware found on isolated laptop. No impact 
on grid operations. 
04/2017 EirGrid (Ireland) [70] No 
Hackers gained access to the utility’s 
communications by tapping their Vodafone 
network. No impact on grid operations. 
05/2017 
Wolf Creek Nuclear 
Operating Corp (US) 
No 
Hackers compromised computers by emailing 
fake resumes that contained malicious code to 
senior engineers. No impact on grid operations. 
 
In this section, we will discuss several significant cyber-attacks that are relevant 
to power system cybersecurity. The first is the well-known Stuxnet attack in 2009-2010 
that was able to bridge an air-gapped industrial control system in Iran that was used for 
uranium-enrichment. Although Stuxnet was not an attack on the power grid, it does 
demonstrate that air-gapping alone is not enough to protect industrial control systems. 
The second cyber-attack discussed in this section is the December 2015 cyber-attack in 
Ukraine. This incident is the first well-documented cyber-attack on a power system that 
succeeded in shutting off power to customers. It was almost certainly carried out by a 
nation-state, and it was incredibly sophisticated in nature. The third cyber-attack we will 
study is the December 2016 cyber-attack in Ukraine. Using information that was most 
likely obtained during the 2015 attacks, attackers were able to shut off power in Kiev, 
Ukraine for approximately an hour. This incident was potentially a dry run to test the 
latest malware on a large-scale power grid.  
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4.4.1 Stuxnet (2009) 
Stuxnet was most likely a cyber-weapon developed by nation-states to target the 
uranium-enrichment facilities in Iran. (It reportedly ruined almost 20% of Iran’s nuclear 
centrifuges, and 58% of the infected computers were in Iran [71].) It is noteworthy as the 
first confirmed example of malware that was specifically tailored to target industrial 
control systems used for power plants, dams, oil pipelines, and other critical 
infrastructure. Despite the fact that the facilities utilized air gaps, Stuxnet was able to 
bridge them via infected USB drives. (Air gaps are network security measures to ensure 
that a secure computer network is physically isolated from unsecured networks such as 
the Internet. They are typically used in military/government computer systems, financial 
computer systems, industrial control systems such as SCADA, and life-critical systems 
including nuclear power plant controls. They represent nearly the maximum protection 
one network could have from another network.) Once Stuxnet entered a system, the 
worm would infect and update other network computers that were not directly connected 
to the Internet. Its target was to look for computers and networks with very specific 
configurations. 
First, it would infect all machines that were running Microsoft Windows. It was 
able to evade automatic detection systems, because its device drivers were digitally 
signed with the private keys of two certificates from JMicron and Realtek, which allowed 
it to install kernel-mode rootkit drivers without notifying users. Next, it would look for 
whether a given machine contained project files from Siemens’s WinCC/PCS 7 (Step 7) 
SCADA control software and infect them. It intercepted communications between the 
WinCC software and the target Siemens PLC devices, so that it could install itself on 
PLCs unnoticed. Stuxnet’s payload only attacked PLC systems with variable-frequency 
drives from two vendors: Vacon (Finland) and Fararo Paya (Iran), and it monitored the 
frequency of the attached motors, attacking only systems that spin between 807 Hz and 
1210 Hz. When specific criteria were met, it modified the frequency to 1410 Hz, then to 
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2 Hz, and then to 1064 Hz, thus changing the rotational speed of the connected motors. It 
also installs a rootkit that masked these changes in rotational speed from monitoring 
systems, so that the centrifuges still appeared to be operating normally even when they 
were not [71]. The way the worm was spread is illustrated in Figure 22. Figure 23 
illustrates the potential vulnerabilities in an industrial control system network. 
 
Figure 22. Attack procedure in Stuxnet ICS cyber-attack [72] 
 
There are several key takeaways from Stuxnet. First, it specifically targeted 
industrial control systems. Next it was able to bridge air gaps, which are the industry 
standard for network protection. Finally it spied on fast-spinning centrifuges, altering 
their speed to cause them to tear themselves apart while providing false normal feedback 
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to monitoring systems. That final step was crucial in masking the attack and fooling 
human operators into believing that the centrifuges were still performing as intended. 
This real-world example demonstrates the level of coordination and sophistication that 
can be expected from a nation-state that decides to attack critical infrastructure such as 
the power grid. It also illustrates that such an attack would be difficult but not impossible 
to carry out, requiring vast amounts of resources, planning, and reconnaissance. 
 
 
Figure 23. Potential vulnerabilities in an ICS cyber-attack [73] 
 
4.4.2 Ukraine (2015)  
 The 2015 cyber-attack on the Ukraine power grid is the first known cyber-attack 
on the grid that succeeded in disrupting electricity service to end users. This attack was 
almost certainly engineered by a nation-state with the motivation being political in 
nature. The end result was that the control centers of 3 regional electricity distribution 
companies were directly affected (3 more experienced intrusion that did not impact 
operations). A total of 30 substations were disconnected, and approximately 225,000 
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customers (a total load loss of over 130 MW) lost power for 1 to 6 hours. More than two 
months after the attack, the control centers were still not fully operational. The attackers 
had overwritten firmware on critical devices at 16 substations, leaving them unable to 
respond to remote operator commands. Thus workers had to control these breakers 
manually. 
 According to [74], the events unfolded as follows. On December 23, 2015, 
Prykarpattyaoblenergo (one of the electric utilities in Western Ukraine) detected that 
power was out in the region’s main city, Ivano-Frankivsk. The cause was unknown at 
first. Then the oblenergo discovered that a third party was able to illegally enter their 
computer and SCADA systems, using them to remotely disconnect substation breakers. 
Also, its call center was having technical difficulties due to an influx of calls. Two other 
utilities Kyivobnergo and Chernivtsioblenergo were attacked within 30 minutes of each 
other. The attackers disconnected seven 110 kV and twenty-three 35 kV substations for 
three hours. In order to respond to the attack, operators were forced to switch to manual 
mode since remote commands were not operational.  
 This attack utilized a number of sophisticated techniques. They included the 
following [7]: 
• Spear-phishing emails to gain access to the oblenergos’ business networks 
• BlackEnergy 3 malware embedded in manipulated Microsoft Office documents 
(Excel and Word) to steal credentials from the business networks 
• Modified KillDisk to erase master boot record, select logs, and system events 
• Use of the Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) system to disconnect load with 
scheduled service outage 
• Telephone DoS attack on the oblenergo’s call center to deny outage reporting 
Figure 24 illustrates how the attackers infiltrated the utilities’ control centers. 
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Figure 24. Attack procedure in Ukraine grid cyber-attack [75] 
 
4.4.3 Ukraine (2016) 
On December 17, 2016, a second cyber-attack on Ukraine’s power grid occurred. 
This time the target was Ukrenergo (a regional electric utility), and the attack caused one-
fifth of Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, to lose power for approximately one hour. It has 
been speculated that this second attack was a large-scale test of the latest malware dubbed 
alternately as Industroyer or Crash Override. Unlike in 2015 where the attackers gained 
access to the utility networks and manually turned off power to electrical substations, the 
2016 cyber-attack was entirely automated. Fully automated cyber-attacks can cause 
blackouts faster, with less preparation, and with less human oversight, making them far 
more scalable. According to [76], if you estimate that it took more than 20 people to 
attack three utilities  in 2015, that same team could target more than ten utilities at a time 
in 2016.   
It is unclear how Crash Override infected Ukrenergo. ESET (a Slovakian anti-
virus firm), one of the two cybersecurity firms that analyzed this incident, suspects that 
the same type of targeted phishing emails that were used in the 2015 attack may have 
been used in 2016 as well. Once Crash Override infected Windows machines on a 
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network, it is able to automatically map out the control system and locate the target 
equipment. Then it could launch one of four payload modules that communicate with 
equipment via different industrial communication protocols (IEC 60870-5-101, IEC 
60870-5-104, IEC 61850, and OPC DA) [77]. The malware has several features designed 
to enable it to remain under the radar. For example, communication can be limited to 
non-working hours, and it can masquerade as the Notepad application.  It can also erase 
crucial system registry keys and overwrite files to make the system unbootable and 
recovery more difficult. The architecture of this malware is shown in Figure 25. 
 
Figure 25. Crash Override malware architecture [77] 
 
ESET suggests that Crash Override has an additional feature that attackers could 
use to cause physical damage to power equipment; it has a denial-of-service tool that 
exploits a known vulnerability in the Siemens Siprotec digital relay. By sending the relay 
a carefully crafted chunk of data, Crash Override could disable the device until it is 
manually rebooted. In July 2015, Siemens released a firmware update for its vulnerable 
Siprotec relays and suggests that owners patch their devices. The intent of the feature 
might be to cut off access to circuit breakers after the malware opens them. If used in 
combination with a feature that overloads critical components (such as transformers), it 
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could cause severe damage to that equipment since circuit breakers would be unable to 
prevent them from overheating. 
Dragos Inc. independently verified some of ESET’s findings [78]. In their defense 
recommendations, they suggested that electric utilities: 
• Understand where IEC 104, IEC 61850 and DNP3 protocols are used in their 
systems, look for increased usage of the protocols against known environment 
baselines, and look for systems leveraging these protocols that have not used 
them before. 
• Prepare incident response plans and perform table top exercises, including 
practice manual operations to recover compromised SCADA equipment. 
They suggested that electric utilities should not: 
• Rely on DNP3 as a protection mechanism simply because Crash Override did 
not have an explicit DNP3 module. 
• Rely on air gapped networks, unidirectional firewalls, anti-virus in the ICS, 
and other passive defense/architecture changes. “No amount of security 
control will protect against a determined human adversary. Human defenders 
are required.” 
4.5 U.S. Response 
4.5.1 Government Analysis and Response 
In January 2018, the New York Times reported that “A newly drafted United 
States nuclear strategy… would permit the use of nuclear weapons to respond to… cyber-
attacks” [79]. The U.S. government has identified cyber-attacks as a major threat to 
critical infrastructure, which includes the transmission power grid, and thus national 
security, so it is considering the use of nuclear weapons as an appropriate response to 
nation-states that carry out cyber-attacks against U.S. infrastructure. This action 
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illustrates the seriousness of the threat that cyber-attacks poses to our nation and the 
extent to which the U.S. government is willing to go to combat them. 
In March 2018, the U.S. government issued a technical alert entitled “Russian 
Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
[80].” In the alert, they discussed different tactics, techniques, and practices used by 
Russian government threat actors on American victim networks since at least March 
2016. There are commonly two categories of victims: staging targets and intended 
targets. Staging targets are peripheral organizations such as third-party suppliers with less 
secure networks that are initially attacked so that the attackers can then reach their final 
intended targets such as organizational networks for government and critical 
infrastructure. To reach their intended targets, Russian threat actors will use practices that 
include spear-phishing emails from compromised legitimate accounts, watering-hole 
domains, credential gathering, open-source and network reconnaissance, host-based 
exploitation, and targeting industrial control system infrastructure. 
The Lockheed-Martin Cyber Kill Chain model adopted by the Department of 
Homeland Security includes the following phases: reconnaissance, weaponization, 
delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control, and actions on the objective.  
Stage 1 – Reconnaissance: Threat actors accessed publicly available information 
hosted by organization-monitored networks to look for information on network and 
organizational design, used compromised staging targets to download source code for 
intended targets’ websites, and attempted to remotely access corporate email/VPN 
connections. 
Stage 2 – Weaponization: Threat actors used Microsoft Office email attachments 
to obtain a credential hash and then use password-cracking techniques to get the plaintext 
password. Also threat actors developed compromised staging targets (e.g. trade 
publications, informational websites on infrastructure, ICS, etc.) into watering holes, 
where they embedded malicious code into those websites to harvest credentials.  
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Stage 3 – Delivery: Threat actors used generic PDF documents that contained a 
shortened URL which led users to a website that prompted them for their email address 
and password. In some cases, the attachments masqueraded as contracts, resumes, 
invitations, or policy documents to entice users to open them. 
Stage 4 – Exploitation: To capture user credentials, threat actors used malicious 
.docx files, which connected to a command and control server owned by either the threat 
actors or a victim. When a user attempted to authenticate to the domain, the server was 
provided with the hash of the password. Local users received a graphical user interface 
prompt to enter a username/password, which the server received. 
Stage 5 – Installation: Threat actors used compromised credentials to 
masquerade as authorized users in environments that only use single-factor 
authentication. Threat actors created local administrator accounts in the staging targets 
(sometimes disguised as legitimate backup accounts) and placed files within the intended 
targets. Once inside an intended target’s network, threat actors downloaded tools from a 
remote server. 
 Stage 6 – Command and Control: Threat actors created web shells on intended 
targets’ publicly accessible web and email servers. 
Stage 7 – Actions on Objectives: Threat actors conducted reconnaissance in the 
intended target’s network by identifying and browsing its file servers. They used 
privileged credentials to access the victim’s domain controller. In multiple instances, they 
accessed workstations/servers on a corporate network that contained data from energy 
generation facilities. They accessed files related to SCADA systems, such as wiring 
diagrams or panel layouts. They targeted and copied profile and configuration 
information for accessing ICS systems on the network. Also they performed cleanup 
operations afterwards to cover up their tracks. 
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4.5.2 Industry Analysis and Response 
Currently transmission substations are subject to mandatory North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation’s Critical Infrastructure Protection (NERC CIP) 
cybersecurity standards and physical security standards (e.g. CIP-014-2 – Physical 
Security), while distribution substations are not (they are governed by individual state 
public utility commissions so cybersecurity standards and/or measures may vary widely). 
Hence, a threat actor is more likely to be able to access a distribution substation, which 
may lack even basic cybersecurity and physical security protection. Although 
transmission substations are protected by NERC CIP regulation, they are still susceptible 
to cyber-attacks at the distribution level. In general, a cyber-attack on a distribution 
substation could open circuit breakers to interrupt power or compromise SCADA 
operations to cause load instability, but these effects would only have impact on local 
electricity service. However, if a threat actor can physically access a distribution SCADA 
master via a substation, which allows access to other distribution and possibly 
transmission elements in the system, this could have much more serious consequences. 
Also, connection points between the transmission system and the distribution system, 
such as step-down transformers, do not always fall under NERC CIP regulation and may 
present additional cyber vulnerabilities [62]. 
There are currently eleven NERC CIP sections, ten of which are related to 
cybersecurity. CIP-002-5.1a covers (bulk electric system) cyber system categorization. 
CIP-003-6 covers security management controls. CIP-004-6 covers personnel and 
training. CIP-005-5 covers electronic security perimeters. CIP-006-6 covers physical 
security of cyber systems. CIP-007-6 covers system security management. CIP-005-5 
covers incident reporting and response planning. CIP-009-6 covers recovery plans for 
(bulk electric system) cyber systems. CIP-010-2 covers configuration change 
management and vulnerability assessments. Finally, CIP-011-2 covers information 
protection. 
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In November 2017, more than 450 organizations and 6,500 individuals 
participated in NERC’s fourth simulated power grid attack exercise known as GridEx 
(held every two years). The exercise was designed to provide an opportunity for different 
industry and government stakeholders to respond to simulated cyber and physical attacks. 
The baseline scenario was composed of a series of four “moves,” each lasting four hours 
(detailed descriptions are provided in Figure 26). It is assumed that coordinated cyber-
physical attacks were able to impact operations at bulk transmission and generation 
facilities, causing outages and some islanding conditions. The simulated cyber-attack 
options included watering hole, patch deployment, and remote access vulnerabilities that 
affected utility ICS. From this exercise, the following lessons were learned [81]: 
• Lead planners need to be more proactive in communicating with local law 
enforcement or utility equipment vendors. 
• Other critical infrastructure such as oil, natural gas, water, and 
telecommunications, which may have interdependencies with the power grid, 
also need to be notified in the event of an attack. 
• The E-ISAC portal, which is designed to be a central hub for information, 
mitigation, and response related to grid cyber-physical attacks, needs to be 
more effective. 
• Utilities need to develop better procedures for external communications in 
order to alert, educate, and inform customers about outages. 
• Utilities need to increase communication resilience in the event that primary 
communication paths are disrupted so that they can maintain contact with 
internal personnel, emergency managers, and first responders. 
• There needs to be increased participation in the Cyber Mutual Assistance 
(CMA) program (launched in 2016), which provides a pool of utility 
cybersecurity experts who volunteer to share their information with other 
utilities in the event of a cyber-emergency. 
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Figure 26. GridEx IV Moves [81] 
 
4.6 Vulnerable Power System Applications 
Most of the research literature on power system cybersecurity categorizes cyber-
attacks on the grid as attacks that target availability, integrity, or confidentiality. Attacks 
that target availability, also known as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, attempt to delay, 
block, or corrupt system communication. These can be targeted at a variety of 
communication layers, like channel jamming at the physical layer, spoofing at the MAC 
layer, distributed traffic flooding at the network and transport layer, and application-layer 
DoS attacks. Because the grid has stringent communication requirements (3 ms for IEC 
61850), an attack that delays a time-critical message can lead to catastrophic results. 
Attacks that target integrity, such as false data injection (FDI), are aimed at the 
application layer and try to stealthily modify critical data so that it compromises the 
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secure operation of the grid. Attacks that target confidentiality eavesdrop on 
communication channels to acquire unauthorized information, such as customers’ 
account numbers and electricity usage. The survey in [82] describes these three classes of 
cyber-attacks in greater detail and discusses vulnerabilities of 1) transmission and 
distribution operations and 2) the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and home-area 
networks for each attack class. 
The literature presents a number of arenas in which cyber-attacks can negatively 
affect the electric grid. Xie et al. demonstrated that an undetectable attack can impact 
market operations and provide opportunities for financial arbitrage [83], [84]. Sridhar and 
Govindarasu showed that a data integrity attack can successfully fool power system 
operators into making the wrong control action via the automatic generation control 
(AGC) loop by maliciously altering the frequency and tie line flow measurements [85]. 
That work was extended in [86] to include how to detect anomalies in the ACE and 
mitigate the effects of such an attack. Sridhar et al. pinpointed other applications with 
cyber vulnerabilities in [87]. The authors divided these vulnerabilities into three 
categories: generation, transmission, and distribution. In generation systems, governor 
control and AGC are potential targets. In transmission systems, the state estimator and 
FACTS devices are vulnerable. In distribution systems, malicious changes to load 
shedding schemes are a concern, and smart meters could be targeted. 
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5 STATE ESTIMATION IN POWER SYSTEM 
CYBERSECURITY 
The work presented in this chapter focuses on investigating and ultimately 
mitigating the impact of two specific types of cyber-attacks on the power grid. The first 
type is bad command injection, where the attacker intercepts a legitimate command from 
the control center and alters it to have a malicious impact on the power system. This type 
of attack is sophisticated, requiring the attacker to have at least partial knowledge of the 
system topology and operation. Also, it is undetectable under current power system 
practices (existing bad data detection tests, such as the largest normalized residual test 
described in Section 2.4, are incapable of identifying this type of attack). The second type 
is a network availability attack such as denial-of-service (DoS) on an RTU. This type of 
attack is less sophisticated and easier to detect, but it can still significantly hamper power 
system operations and operator situational awareness (as discussed in later sections). 
Chapter 5 is organized as follows. Section 5.1 describes the process for traditional 
power system security assessment. In Section 5.2, we propose a new cyber-physical 
security assessment (CPSA) methodology and present a new co-simulation environment, 
which includes an enhanced state estimator, that can model the electrical and 
communication networks in a cyber-physical smart grid. We also present simulation 
results for mitigating a bad command injection attack. In Section 5.3, we introduce a 
novel 3D visualization that could be used to identify how a power system event or cyber-
attack evolves over time. In Section 5.4, we present simulation results that demonstrate 
the devastating effect that DoS attacks could have on the state estimator. We also propose 
a new methodology for identifying the most vulnerable RTUs, which are good candidates 
for power system planners and IT staff to focus their resources on securing. 
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5.1 Traditional Power System Security Assessment 
Traditional power system security refers to the ability of a power system to 
withstand disturbances (also referred to as contingencies) without unduly impacting the 
availability or quality of its electricity service to loads. Currently, security assessment 
functions in power system control and operations analyze the vulnerability of the system 
to a set of potential contingencies on a real-time or near real-time basis. At any given 
point in time, power system operators need to be prepared for possible contingencies such 
as the loss of a transmission line, equipment outage, generator failure, a sudden change in 
load demand, and a change in the system configuration. 
The security of the power system can be classified into one of four states: normal 
secure, normal insecure, emergency, or restorative. The system is in a normal secure state 
when all system loads are supplied, no constraints are violated, and there are no 
contingency violations for a set of given contingencies (determined by the balancing 
authority and regulatory agencies). The system is in a normal insecure state when all 
system loads are supplied, no constraints are violated, but there are one or more 
contingency violations for a set of given contingencies. The system is in an emergency 
state when all of the loads in the system are supplied but one or more constraints are 
violated. Finally, the system is in a restorative state when there is a loss of load and no 
constraint is violated. Table 6 summarizes these classifications. 
 








Normal Secure Yes No No 
Normal Insecure Yes No One or more 
Emergency Yes One or more One or more 




The state diagram in Figure 27 illustrates how a power system can transition 
between these four states, either due to a disturbance or a control action initiated by the 
operator. Assuming the system starts out in a normal secure state, a disturbance can cause 
the system to enter a normal insecure state. If preventive control actions are taken in time, 
the system can return to a normal secure state. If not, a disturbance could potentially push 
the system into an emergency state. At that point, corrective control actions need to be 
taken quickly to restore the system to a normal state. However, if they are not taken in 
time or if the best option is to shed load, then the system enters a restorative state. Once 
further control actions are taken, the system is finally restored to a normal secure state. 
Examples of control actions include opening or closing transmission lines and 
transformers, changing the setting of generation/load, bypassing or putting into service 
series capacitors, and changing phase-shifter angles. 
 
Figure 27. Power system security state diagram 
 
Traditional power system security assessment (illustrated in Figure 28) only 
analyzes the impact of contingencies on the electrical network. The first step is security 
monitoring, during which the control center polls substation RTUs to obtain real-time  
electrical measurements. These raw measurements are then processed by the state 
estimator, which determines if the system is observable and eliminates or corrects 
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inconsistent measurements. These filtered measurements are then passed onto the real-
time power flow application, which calculates the bus voltage magnitudes, angles, 
real/reactive injections, and real/reactive line flows. The power flow solution serves as 
the base case for real-time contingency analysis, which is an automatic what-if 
assessment of the impact of each contingency on the system. The base case serves as the 
reference scenario. Then for each contingency, a sequential simulation is run on the 
reference scenario, the post-contingency real/reactive line flows are calculated, and 
thermal limit violations are reported before the reference scenario is restored. The results 
of those violations are visualized using a large-scale display. The entire process runs 
automatically every few minutes. 
 
Figure 28. Traditional power system security assessment 
 
5.2 Cyber-Physical Security Assessment 
The smart grid is a cyber-physical system whose electrical components and 
communication system are strongly intertwined. Traditional power system security 
assessment tools only focus on analyzing the security of the physical power system itself. 
However, as the grid evolves to become more reliant on information and communication 
technology, it becomes increasingly important to analyze the cyber-physical interactions 
between the electrical system and the communication system, rather than focus only on 
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the electrical system. Hence, there is the need to create a co-simulation environment that 
is capable of capturing the behavior of the cyber-physical smart grid. Also, there needs to 
be cyber-physical security assessment tools that can identify when a bad command 
injection attack is in progress and alert power system operators to the potential impacts 
on the power system. 
5.2.1 System and Threat Models 
Assume there exists a cyber-physical smart grid with multiple electrical and 
communication nodes. Due to limited resources, it is infeasible to physically protect or 
secure every single node in the cyber-physical system. While conventional cybersecurity 
measures are available and deployed in the system, they are incapable of detecting data-
related cyber-attacks on their own.  
For the subsequent work, we assume a centralized power system architecture, 
where control, operation, and monitoring functions are performed by a single control 
center. The communication system between the control center and the substation RTUs is 
a star topology (as illustrated in Figure 29). Bidirectional communication is possible. The 
control center can poll the substation RTUs for measurements as well as send commands 
to them. Under normal operations, the RTUs can report equipment statuses and 
measurements back to the control center. Assume an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) 
has been mirrored at the connected port of each substation as well as at the control center.  
In our scenario, we assume that a malicious actor compromises a legitimate 
control command issued by power system operators at the control center to a substation 
RTU. Through a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker alters the command to be 
malicious. The RTU executes the malicious command to trip a circuit breaker (for a 
transmission line, generator, or load). The consequences of this attack are as follows. 
First, the malicious command has a detrimental effect on the operation of the power 
system. Secondly, the circuit breaker status at the control center is incorrect and 
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inconsistent with the actual status. Finally, the incorrect system topology is fed as inputs 
to downstream EMS applications. 
 
 
Figure 29. Cyber-physical smart grid topology 
 
5.2.2 Use Case Scenarios 
An adversary can perform a bad command injection attack by sending a false 
control command to a substation RTU. If the adversary has no knowledge of the system 
and simply injects a false command at random, the power system operator should be able 
to identify and stop the execution of the malicious command on the power system. 
However, if the adversary has at least partial knowledge (or full knowledge in the worst 
case) of the system, they can purposefully inject a specific malicious command to cause 
maximum damage to the overall system. If the adversary issues a bad command from an 
illegitimate source, the IDS will be able to detect the malicious nature of the command 
and prevent its execution on the power system. However, if the adversary has the 
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capability to model an “intelligent” malicious command, which is issued by a legitimate 
source and appears to be a routine operation but has undesirable consequences (for 
example, suddenly reducing power generation by 50%), the IDS most likely will be 
unable to correctly detect it. However, it could alert the operator by sending a notification 
of suspicious behavior (considering user-defined threshold values and historical changes 
in values). One example of a malicious command that could significantly impact the 
power system is the opening of the circuit breaker connected to the largest generator in 
the system. 
Three specific use case scenarios are described below: 
Use Case 1 
• Description – Adversary impersonates the network and sends a false (unwanted) but 
legitimate command outside of the control center to the circuit breaker of the largest 
generator. 
• Effects on the Communication Network – Under this attack, we can observe and 
monitor several effects on the communication system, such as: 
1) The IDS notifies the operator which command it received. The operator verifies 
whether the command is legitimate. 
2) A false command is issued to the substation RTU connected to the breaker of the 
targeted generator. 
• Effects on the Power System – If this attack is successful, we can observe the 
following impacts on the power system: 
1) Insecure operation of the power system 
2) Possible shedding of electrical load 
• Use Case Steps: 
1) The attacker targets a bad command as described in the threat model. 
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2) The IDS detects a suspected malicious command (based on its rules such as IP 
address, port number, etc.) and notifies the operator. The operator verifies that the 
control center did not issue this command. 
3) CPSA performs power flow and cyber-physical contingency analysis to evaluate 
the effect of the command on the power system if it was allowed to go through 
and discovers that the system would become insecure, indicating that the 
command was malicious. 
4) The operator discards the command. Secure system operation is restored. 
Use Case 2 
• Description – The adversary fabricates or modifies a legitimate command sent to a 
generator breaker over an insecure network. 
• Effects on the Communication Network - Same as Use Case 1, except the legitimate 
command was modified over the network. 
• Effects on the Power System – Same as Use Case 1. 
• Use Case Steps: 
1) The attacker sends a command as described in the threat model. 
2) The IDS does not detect the command modification, but still sends a notification 
to the operator. The operator verifies that the control center did not issue the 
command. 
3) Same as Step 3 for Use Case 1. 
4) CPSA queries IT personnel for information. IT responds that they suspect a 
MITM attack. 
5) Same as Step 4 in Use Case 1. 
Use Case 3 
• Description – The adversary is an insider at the control center, who sends a legitimate 
but unwanted command to the generator breaker. 
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• Effects on the Communication Network – The operator receives a command 
notification from the IDS and finds the transmitted legitimate command was not 
issued by them. In the worst case scenario, the operator ignores the notification and 
allows the execution of the command on the power system. 
• Effects on the Power System – Same as Use Case 1. 
• Use Case Steps: 
1) The attacker sends a command as described in the threat model. 
2) The IDS does not detect the insider attack and notifies the operator that it is a 
legitimate command. The operator verifies that the received command is the same 
as what was issued from the control center. 
3) The generator breaker receives a false trip command and trips. 
4) CPSA runs contingency analysis and discovers that the system is in an insecure 
state, indicating that the command was legitimate but false (unwanted). 
5) CPSA queries IT personnel for information. IT responds that they suspect an 
insider attack. CPSA prompts the operator to reclose the breaker. 
6) If the breaker does not respond after 20 seconds, CPSA will prompt the operator 
to initiate the appropriate remedial action scheme, after which secure system 
operation is restored. 
5.2.3 Co-simulator Overview 
This section provides an overview description of the novel co-simulation 
environment used in this work to simulate a bad command injection attack. The design 
framework of the co-simulator is shown in Figure 30. The co-simulator is composed of 
three main modules. The first module, which was implemented using a combination of 
Java APIs (GridSim, Matlabcontrol, and Java Agent DEvelopment Framework, also 
known as JADE), models the communication network and acts as the simulation driver. 
The second module (described in greater detail in Section 5.2.4), which was implemented 
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in MATLAB, is the main computational engine that handles observability analysis, state 
estimation, power flow, contingency analysis, and cyber-physical security assessment. 
The third module deals with the topology information as well as visualization of 
simulation results. The interface between the communication network/simulator driver to 
the CPSA module is Java to MATLAB. The interface between the CPSA module and the 
visualization module is MATLAB to PowerWorld, a commercial power system 
solver/software package.  
 
Figure 30. Overall Co-simulator Framework 
 
The sub-modules of the communication network/simulation driver module (which 
resides in Java) are as follows:  
• Communication network configurator – This sub-module is responsible for 
modeling the communication network between the control center and the 
RTUs, which includes the communication network topology, number of 
connected devices in the network, the baud rate, number of packets sent, the 
control center packet size, RTU packet size, and the propagation delay over 
the communication channel. 
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• Power system model validator – This sub-module is responsible for validating 
at the beginning of each simulation that the electrical network parameters in 
the co-simulator match the values in the original test case. This step is 
necessary to ensure that the test case from PowerWorld was not corrupted 
during the loading process. 
• Resource configurator – This sub-module allows the user to configure 
GridSim resources instantiated during the simulation with the following 
attributes: number of processors and speed of processing. The resource speed 
and the job execution time are defined in terms of the Millions of Instructions 
per Second (MIPS). 
• User configurator – This sub-module creates GridSim users (who 
communicate by sending/receiving passive event objects efficiently) and a 
simulation instance that contains an application description (list of simulation 
actions to be processed). For example, each RTU is considered a user, and the 
control center is also a user. The control center user instance is different from 
an RTU user instance in that only the control center can execute polling 
commands. Both the control center and the RTUs implement a time 
minimization strategy by immediately sending requested data as soon as they 
receive the request. 
• Grid scenario configurator – This sub-module allows the user to select 
whether they want to simulate normal operations, a single cyber-attack, or a 
simultaneous combination of cyber-attacks. The result is passed onto either 
the normal operation configurator or the cyber-physical attack configurator. 
• Normal operation configurator – This sub-module handles the event-driven 
simulation for normal system operations (no cyber-attack). 
• Cyber-physical attack configurator – This sub-module handles the event-
driven simulation for the system under a cyber-physical attack. The user can 
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select the duration of the simulated attack, the timestep at which the simulated 
attack occurs, as well as the type of attack. If a single bad command injection 
attack is selected, there is an attack modeler which can model a bad command 
which impacts a transmission line, bus, generator, load, transformer, or shunt 
capacitor. 
The sub-modules of the topology/visualization module (which resides in 
PowerWorld and is accessible through the SimAuto COM object) are as follows: 
• Cyber-physical power system definition – This sub-module provides power 
system information as input to the co-simulator, which includes power system 
measurements (real flow, reactive flow, real injection, reactive injection, and 
voltage magnitude), different parameters for components (such as 
transmission lines, buses, generators, loads, shunt capacitors, and 
transformers), and the system topology at the time of data acquisition. 
• Time-series system dynamics visualization - This sub-module is responsible 
for visualizing the time-evolving behavior of the cyber-physical system, both 
for normal operation as well as when the system is under a cyber-attack. 
Traditional power system visualizations only display the electrical network 
while the hybrid cyber-physical visualization in Figure 31 shows the 
intertwined electrical and communication networks. The typical power system 
one-line diagram symbols are used to represent electrical components. The 
orange lines represent electrical connections, while the grey lines with blue 
squares indicate communication links. The small grey square next to each bus 
represents a router. Each router is connected to the control center. This novel 
type of visualization helps power system operators to quickly identify the 
source of a suspected problem. The time-evolving behavior of the system is 
illustrated using animation. An alternative approach to visualizing time-
evolving behavior is discussed in Section 5.3. 
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Figure 31. Co-simulator visualization of cyber-physical system 
 
5.2.4 Proposed Methodology 
We propose a new cyber-physical security assessment methodology (illustrated in 
Figure 32b) that considers both the electrical and communication networks. This 
methodology was encapsulated in the CPSA module and incorporated into the co-
simulator described in Section 5.2.3. First we used the co-simulator to model the cyber-
physical grid. After the control center polls substation RTUs, the real-time measurements 
are sent to the IDS. The measurements are passed through to the state estimator, which 
performs observability analysis, state estimation, and bad data detection to flag 
inconsistent measurements.  
If the IDS suspects a cyber-attack, then it alerts the power system operator using a 
dialog. For example, assume the IDS suspects a bad command injection attack (also 
modeled using the co-simulator) on the circuit breaker for a generator. The IDS sends an 
alert and prompts the operator to simulate the impact of allowing the suspicious 
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command to be carried out. The CPSA power flow application simulates opening that 
circuit breaker. Then the CPSA contingency analysis application uses the scenario with 
the open generator breaker as the reference case. Once the contingency analysis is done, 
CPSA compares the metrics for the case when the command was rejected versus the case 
when the command was allowed. A user-defined threshold based on historical 
information determines the maximum allowable increased insecurity before more 
verification steps are necessary. If the system is known to be under threat, CPSA initiates 
modeling of the worst-case attack scenario. Then a large-scale time-evolving 
visualization of the cyber-physical system is presented to the operator. 
 
 
 Figure 32. Proposed cyber-physical security assessment 
 
The CPSA module, which encapsulates the new proposed CPSA methodology, 
runs automatically every few minutes to assess the current health of the cyber-physical 
system. The sub-modules of the CPSA module (which was implemented in MATLAB) 
are as follows: 
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• Observability analysis – This sub-module uses available power system 
measurements to identify whether the power system is observable (i.e. a 
unique estimate can be found). It uses the numerical observability analysis 
algorithm described in Section 2.3.1 to identify observable islands. If the 
entire system or a part of the system is found to be unobservable, then the 
worst case scenario is assumed for the unobservable portion(s). 
• State estimation – This sub-module uses raw measurement values from RTUs 
to calculate the most likely system state. It uses the AC weighted least squares 
solution method described in Section 2.2.1. It uses the largest normalized 
residual test algorithm described in Section 2.4.1 to attempt to identify 
inconsistent electrical measurements. 
• Power flow – Both legitimate measurements and suspicious measurements are 
inputs to this sub-module. The solution of the power flow (bus voltage 
magnitudes and angles) is used to calculate real/reactive transmission line 
flows and real/reactive bus injections. These results serve as the reference 
(pre-contingency scenario) for the next sub-module. 
• Contingency analysis – This sub-module generates a list of cyber-physical 
contingencies. Then, using the power flow results from the previous sub-
module as the reference scenario, each cyber-physical contingency from a 
user-defined set of contingency definitions is simulated on top of the reference 
scenario to evaluate the potential impact on the cyber-physical system. The 
worst contingencies (above a user-defined threshold) are identified and 
flagged for the power system operator. 
• Cyber-physical security assessment – This sub-module assesses the cyber-
physical security of the system using inputs from other sub-modules. First, the 
IDS sends an alert to this sub-module if it suspects a malicious command has 
been sent. Next the contingency analysis sub-module provides the outcomes 
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of its what-if scenarios. Then this sub-module computes a metric known as the 
system aggregate megawatt contingency overload (sysAMWCO), which is 
defined below, for the simulated scenario where the suspicious command is 
rejected as well as the simulated scenario where the suspicious command is 
allowed to execute. By comparing the difference in sysAMWCO, the power 
system operator can evaluate whether the suspicious command is actually 
malicious. Large sysAMWCO values indicate more system insecurity, while 
low sysAMWCO values indicate more system security. The suspicious 
command is rejected if the sysAMWCO difference is greater than a user-
defined threshold (established using historical information and operator 
experience), and it is allowed to execute if the sysAMWCO difference is less 
than the threshold. 
The sysAMWCO metric is defined as a function of the aggregate megawatt 
contingency overload (AMWCO), which is in turn a function of the aggregate percentage 
contingency overload (APCO). 
 
 





 𝐴𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑂𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ(𝑗,𝑘) = 𝐴𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ(𝑗,𝑘) ×𝑀𝑉𝐴 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ(𝑗,𝑘)  (151) 
 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝐴𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑂 = ∑ 𝐴𝑀𝑊𝐶𝑂𝑏𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐ℎ(𝑗,𝑘)




Although the primary use case for the CPSA module in the co-simulator is real-
time analysis that is performed automatically every few minutes, it can also be used for 
faster-than-real-time analysis. For example, future predictive information such as load 
forecasts and renewable generation output forecasts (e.g. for the next 30 minutes) could 
be used as inputs into the co-simulator. Assuming the predictions are available in 1-
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minute intervals, the co-simulator can evaluate the cyber-physical security of the system 
for the next 30 timesteps. The time required for the co-simulator to run is only a few 
minutes so we can effectively analyze the system in faster-than-real-time. Once that 
simulation is complete and the forecasts for the next 30 minutes are available, we can use 
the co-simulator to assess the cyber-physical security of the system during that window 
of time.  
5.2.5 Simulation Results 
We tested the proposed CPSA methodology on a 42-bus equivalent system of a 
real power grid in the United States. The electrical network topology of the 42-bus 
system is shown in Figure 33. The system consisted of 24 substations, 45 transmission 
lines, 16 transformers, 8 generators, and 27 loads (approximately 902 MW). 
The communication network topology of the test system is shown in Figure 34. 
The communication system consists of two routers, a link from the control center to the 
first router, a connection between the two routers, and 24 links to each of the 24 
substations.  
The graphical user interface for the co-simulator is shown in Figure 35. The user 
inputs system simulation parameters into the GUI, which are then fed into the 
communication network/simulation driver module of the co-simulator (described in 
Section 5.2.3). For this test system, the baud rate was 1572864 bits/second, the 
propagation delay was 300 ms, the packet buffer size at the control center was 180 bytes, 
and the packet buffer size at the RTU was 1500 bytes. The propagation delay was 
estimated based on the number of bits transmitted in a packet (2553 kbit) over the 
network, which has a speed of 8.51 Mbps. 
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Figure 34. Communication network topology for 42-bus test system 
 




Figure 35. Co-simulator GUI 
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 The cyber-physical system operates normally from timestep t = 1 to t = 4. At t = 
5, the adversary sends a command to one of the RTUs to open the largest generator. The 
IDS suspects that this command is not legitimate based on its rules. Hence, the IDS sends 
an alert to the operator at the control center. The operator decides to simulate the 
suspicious command and observe its effect on the power system. First, the operator uses 
the co-simulator to simulate the normal operation scenario (i.e. the command is not 
allowed to execute) given load and renewable generation forecasts. Then the operator 
simulates the scenario if the command is allowed to execute on the system.  
These results are shown in Figure 36. The load profile is assumed to be the same 
for both the normal operation scenario and the scenario where there is a bad command 
injection attack (the attack only targeted generation). If the command is rejected, then the 
sysAMWCO at t = 5 would be approximately 200, and the sysAMWCO at t = 6 would 
be approximately 170. However, if the command was allowed to execute on the system, 
the sysAMWCO at t = 5 would increase to approximately 300, and the sysAMWCO at t 
= 6 would increase to approximately 225. That would be an increase of approximately 
50% and 32%. The user-defined maximum allowable threshold was only 15% above the 
normal operation case, so the operator rejects the suspicious command and flags it as 
malicious for the IT department to investigate and take further action.  
In addition to presenting the sysAMWCO plots to the operator, the co-simulator 
also provides a large-scale dynamic visualization to the operator that uses animation to 
show the time-varying behavior of the system under the bad command injection attack. 
When the system was in normal operation from t = 1 to t = 4, this visualization appeared 
with no electrical network violations and no communication link issues (see Figure 31). 
However, at t = 5, this visualization changes to indicate thermal limit violations on 
multiple transmission lines in the electrical network, and the communication links that 
are compromised are highlighted using a flashing animation (see Figure 37). Also, the 
sysAMWCO plot on the right side of the visualization changes from green to red when 
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the sysAMWCO metric is more than 85% of a user-defined threshold. This color change 
immediately draws the operator’s attention and aids in quick identification of the source 
of the problem. 
 
 
Figure 36. Detection of a bad command injection attack by comparing the normal operation 
sysAMWCO against the sysAMWCO if the command is allowed to execute  
  
  




This work proposed a new cyber-physical security assessment methodology. 
Unlike traditional power system security assessment, it considers both the electrical and 
communication system. The methodology was tested on a 42-bus realistic power system 
using a co-simulator that was built in Java, MATLAB, and PowerWorld. The cyber-
physical security of the system was assessed using a metric known as the system 
AMWCO. By comparing this metric for a normal operation scenario and the scenario 
where the suspicious command was executed, the operator can determine if the execution 
of a suspicious command will lead to system-wide instability. A large-scale dynamic 
visualization that illustrates the time-varying behavior of the system under attack aids the 
operator in quickly identifying the source of the problem. 
 
5.3 Spatiotemporal Power System Visualization 
In the work presented in Section 5.2, the co-simulator visualization used 
animation to illustrate dynamic time-varying power system behavior. This visualization 
method is commonly used in commercially available power system analysis tools, but it 
has several drawbacks. If the power system operator needs to reference the system 
topology while studying the time-varying behavior, they would need to replay the 
animation multiple times in order to gather the necessary information. Also, research has 
shown that static snapshots are generally easier for users to navigate rather than 
animations. We need a new visualization method that would allow the operator to both 
see the system topology while analyzing the time-varying behavior. 
5.3.1 Introduction 
 Power system operators, planners, and managers need to quickly analyze large 
complex datasets in order to make effective decisions for the bulk electric grid. The 
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challenge is to present the relevant information in a manner that facilitates intuitive and 
rapid assessment of the system state [88]. To mitigate the information overload 
experienced by grid operators and decision makers, it is necessary to develop a 
visualization platform capable of quickly transforming large datasets into visual 
representations that are easy to understand at a glance. Of special importance is the 
ability to analyze temporal (both look-ahead and past) data. Look-ahead capabilities are 
crucial for understanding the emerging stochastic nature of the grid due to the integration 
of non-dispatchable renewable energy, demand response, and storage. These capabilities 
can be used by operators to assess the likelihood of possible future problems in the 
network as well as pinpoint how an event began. 
 Most of the existing work has focused on representing power system data for only 
a single point in time. This type of static large-scale 2-D visualization does not support 
the aforementioned requirements for temporal analysis. One way to fill this void is a 
visualization that allows users to see multiple time steps simultaneously. We propose a 
3D approach that only renders the relevant time-varying data on top of a one-line diagram 
and allows navigation of various timesteps. This type of visualization could be used to 
show when the power system has entered an insecure state, either physical or cyber-
physical. For example, it can pinpoint when problems such as thermal limit violations 
begin to emerge during a power system event. Also, it could be used to indicate when 
parts of the network become unobservable from loss of measurements, either due to 
instrumentation/communication error or from a cyber-attack.  
5.3.2 Literature Review 
 Various visualization methods have been developed in the past to aid in the 
interpretation of power system data, although only some have made their way into the 
hands of practicing engineers. These techniques include animated flow arrows [89], bus 
voltage and transmission line contours [90], and 3D bar graphs [91], [92], which can all 
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be found in the commercial software package PowerWorld [93]. Using time sliders to 
explore time-varying networks is generally more effective than animation. Farrugia and 
Quigley [94] conducted studies to compare two common approaches: animation and 
static snapshots. They concluded that static snapshots are generally more effective in 
terms of task completion time. To tackle the limitation of the snapshot-based approach, 
DiffAni [95] integrated several interaction techniques into a snapshot-based visualization. 
 Recent research has investigated the use of three-dimensional space for 
visualizing time-varying networks. Itoh et al. [96] stacked 2-dimensional planes on a 
horizontal axis to represent time- varying networks. Tominski et al. [97] presented a 
similar approach for visualizing spatiotemporal data, but they used a vertical axis for 
time. We chose to apply this stacking approach to visualizing the evolution of power 
system states. Previous work has also attempted a hybrid approach of using 3-D and 2-D. 
MatrixCube represents a time-evolving graph as a 3D cube by stacking adjacency 
matrices. Each graph can be represented as a matrix [98]. This type of cube allows users 
to easily explore graph in various perspectives using simple operations, such as filtering 
by slicing the cube (e.g., show only for 3-6pm). 
5.3.3 Proposed Approach 
In this section, we propose a novel 3D spatiotemporal visualization prototype. 
Power system operators need the ability to simultaneously see the system topology as 
well as time-evolving trends in the power system. Our proposed solution is to impose 
data volumes on top of the system one-line for time-evolving system quantities such as 
bus voltages and line thermal limits. The same technique could be extended to generation 
or load levels. The major goal of this approach is to facilitate fast investigation and 
exploration of dynamic behavior in a power system. Because the changes in state are 
summarized by shape and color, the overall state of the system can be understood by the 
user without the need to read individual values. Many contemporary power system 
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visualization tools such as PowerWorld [93] only employ 2D or 3D layouts that 
summarize exact values at an instantaneous point in time. Usually these tools have to 
leverage animation to show how the system changes over time. Often comparison of 
system-wide behavior at two time points is challenging, and comparison of three or more 
time instances is nearly impossible. This is one of the natural limitations when using 
animation to show trends over time. 
The initial prototype of this proposed solution is presented in Figure 38. The one-
line, shown as a semi-transparent floor plan in the middle of the screen, is used to 
indicate the present time. The vertical z-axis indicates different system states over time. 
The +z direction represents future predicted system states. A point higher along the +z 
axis indicates a time further into the future. The –z direction represents historical system 
data. A point lower on the –z axis indicates a time further in the past. The stacked 
cylinders represent line thermal limits in the network at different time points. The size 
and color indicate the severity of the problem. The redder the cylinder and the larger its 
radius, the more severe the line overload is. 
This 3D representation gives users the ability to view system conditions across a 
window of time so that they can determine whether a problem is present in the system, as 
well as when it began and when it is expected to end, which may change as the problem 
evolves. The interactive nature of this visualization allows the user to navigate between 
system states one step at a time. To help distinguish between the current time and any 
past or future states that the user is navigating, the cylindrical slice corresponding to the 
current time is separated from the overall stack. 
The heat map on the left panel shows the user more detailed information about the 
network. Each column along the horizontal dimension shows an interval of time, the 
length of which depends on the use case. Each row indicates the state of a different power 
system quantity in the network, such as bus voltage or line limit. The color shows 
whether the value of the attribute at a specific time falls within the normal range. 
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Accounting for human factors, green was chosen for normal operation while red indicates 
that urgent action is required. Also, a small white arrow points to the present time.  
A second more sophisticated visualization prototype is presented in Figure 39 and 
Figure 40. It was implemented using WebGL, a web browser based 3D rendering 
environment. WebGL was selected for its performance and its compatibility. By 
leveraging graphics hardware at a low level, it offers excellent 3D performance and 
allows graphically complex scenes to run smoothly, enabling real-time interaction and 
exploration. WebGL allows 3D environments with rich user interaction directly in a web 
browser. Currently most mainstream web browsers (e.g., Chrome, Firefox, Internet 
Explorer 11, Safari) can support it. By choosing WebGL, our 3D visualization can run on 
many systems with a wide variety of graphics hardware with very little additional setup. 
 
Figure 38. Initial 3D prototype representation 
 
Each bus in the system is visualized as a vertical volume. The volumes are 
created by modifying the radius of a vertical column based on the desired quantity to be 
visualized at each time step, as shown in Figure 39. Transmission lines are visualized 
using colored lines that run between the buses they connect. The color of the line is 
based on the transmission line flow value. As the loading increases, the transmission 
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lines become more and more visible. In addition to the change in visibility, the color of 
the line also changes from grey to dull red once the thermal loading surpasses 90% of its 
rated limit. As the line flow value increases, the red color becomes brighter until it 
transforms into a stark vivid red at above 105%. When the percent thermal limit 
violation is very low, the associated line is not drawn. We chose to hide the lightly 
loaded lines by default, because they generally operate as expected and are less critical 
for the operators to notice than the lines that are near or above their maximum thermal 
limits. The lines in Figure 40 illustrate the changes in color and opacity as the system 
evolves over time. In this scenario, the shown line was over capacity for the entire study 
time. Currently the prototype supports panning, rotation, zooming, highlighting, and 
click-hiding [99].  
 




Figure 40. Visualization of line thermal limits for a 7-bus test system 
 
5.3.4 Conclusions 
This work proposed a novel 3D stacking visualization as an alternative to the 
animation-style visualizations currently used in commercial power system analysis tools. 
It has the benefit of allowing the power system operator to simultaneously view the 
power system one-line diagram while seeing time-varying behavior in the system. The 
ability to hide irrelevant data prevents the power system operator from being overloaded 
with too much information. 
5.4 N-1 RTU Cyber-Physical Security Assessment Using State Estimation 
Real-time SCADA systems use RTUs to monitor and manage the flow of power 
at electrical substations. As their connectivity to different utility and private networks 
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increases, RTUs are becoming more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Some attacks seek to 
access RTUs to directly control power system devices with the intent to shed load or 
cause equipment damage. Other attacks (such as denial-of-service) target network 
availability and seek to block, delay, or corrupt communications between the RTU and 
the control center. In the most severe case, when communications are entirely blocked, 
the loss of an RTU can cause the power system to become unobservable. It is important 
to understand how losing an RTU impacts the system state (bus voltage magnitudes and 
angles). The system state is determined by the state estimator and serves as the input to 
other critical EMS applications. There is currently no systematic approach for assessing 
the cyber-physical impact of losing RTUs. This paper proposes a methodology for N-1 
RTU cyber-physical assessment that could benefit power system control and operation. 
We demonstrate our approach on the IEEE 14-bus test system as well as on a synthetic 
200-bus system. 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Electric utilities use real-time SCADA systems to monitor and control their assets. 
These systems were originally designed for safety and reliability, so there is an implicit 
assumption of trust of all system components and communications. This implicit trust 
makes them vulnerable to cyber-threats posed by malicious actors. As its connectivity to 
different networks and systems increases, the power grid grows increasingly more 
susceptible to cyber-attacks. 
A typical SCADA system includes devices such as RTUs, programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs), intelligent electronic devices (IEDs), and relays located in electrical 
substations. RTUs are field-based devices that are used to monitor and manage the flow 
of power at a substation. PLCs, IEDs, and relays are used to automate tasks at each 
substation. A control center with central computers manages the remote substation 
equipment. The control center also processes, analyzes, and archives the collected real-
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time information. A communication system is used to convey that information from 
substation RTUs back to the control center as well as send commands from the control 
center to substation RTUs, using a protocol such as DNP3. Once they arrive at the control 
center, raw system measurements are sent to the state estimator, which processes them to 
determine the most likely system state (bus voltage magnitudes and angles). The SE 
solution serves as the input to downstream EMS applications, such as contingency 
analysis and optimal power flow. Hence, it is key that the network is observable (i.e. a 
unique SE solution can be found) and that the solution is accurate.  
The research community has long been aware of the potentially devastating 
impact of a cyber-attack on the state estimator. In 2009, Liu et al. introduced the false 
data injection (FDI) attack, where an attacker can introduce arbitrary state variable errors 
without being detected by existing bad data detection algorithms by manipulating 
measurements [100]. Since then, there has been a growing body of literature focusing on 
stealth deception attacks on the state estimator [83], [84], [101]. However, there is not as 
much work on network availability attacks (NAA), such as denial-of-service (DoS). 
Zhang et al. formulated an optimal DoS attack strategy considering an energy constraint 
[102]–[104], but it was not applied to power systems. Liu et al. studied the effect of a 
DoS attack on load frequency control [105]. Vukovic and Dan considered a DoS attack 
on a fully distributed state estimator as well as detection/localization of the attack [106]. 
None of these works focus on systematically studying the impact of losing RTUs. 
In this work, we present a novel methodology for RTU cyber-physical security 
assessment. For simplicity, we assume that only one RTU is under attack at a given time 
(N-1), although this approach could be generalized to the loss of multiple RTUs. When an 
RTU is under a NAA, the measurements from that RTU will be unavailable to the state 
estimator. In some cases, the system may become unobservable, and the solution will 
contain gross errors. During the loss of telemetry from a cyber-attack, the estimated 
system state could diverge significantly from the actual system state, endangering the 
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grid’s secure operation. Offline studies using our proposed approach could help power 
system planners and IT staff to identify the most critical RTUs and use that information 
to build a system that is more resilient against NAA. Online studies using the same 
approach would detect when the system is vulnerable to the loss of an RTU. 
5.4.2 System and Threat Models 
We assume that the power system has a centralized architecture with a single 
control center that receives and processes telemetry information from the field. We also 
assume there is a star communication topology between the control center and the 
substation RTUs (i.e. the substations can communicate with the control center but not 
with each other). We assume that the attacker is not an insider and thus has no specialized 
knowledge of the system topology/architecture but is capable of attacking an RTU via 
either physical or remote access. 
5.4.3 Methodology 
The objective of this work is to present a methodology to identify and rank 
vulnerable RTUs in an electrical power system so that utilities can bolster the security of 
these critical assets in order to minimize the impact of a potential cyber-attack. The idea 
is comparable to N-1 power system contingency analysis. However, traditional power 
system contingency analysis only considers the loss of physical elements such as a 
generator or transmission line. For our analysis, we focus on the loss of communication 
between an RTU and the control center, meaning the measurements associated with that 
RTU will be unavailable to the state estimator. We quantify the severity of that loss based 
on the number of observable islands created, the number of unobservable buses, and the 
estimation errors. (Refer to Section 2.2.1 for the weighted least squares state estimation 
algorithm and Section 2.3.1 for the nodal variable-based algorithm for numerical 
observability analysis.) 
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Our proposed algorithm is as follows: 
Step 1. Assess the normal operation (no attack) scenario. Identify the observable 
islands and the unobservable buses. 
Step 2. For each RTU, simulate the loss of the measurements connected to that 
RTU. Perform observability analysis (OA) and SE. 
Step 3. If the global slack bus is connected to one of the unobservable buses, 
assign the slack to another bus. 
Step 4. Record the observable island groups, the unobservable buses, the SE 
solution, and the SE solution errors in polar coordinates. The SE solution is 
defined as follows. The voltage at bus 𝑛 in polar coordinates is 𝑉𝑛,𝑆𝐸 =
|𝑉𝑛,𝑆𝐸|∠𝑉𝑛,𝑆𝐸 = 𝑥𝑛+𝑁∠𝑥𝑛, after remapping 𝑥 (refer to Section 2.2.1) to include 
the slack bus angle which is 0. 
Step 5. Restore to the no attack scenario. If not all included RTUs are processed, 
return to Step 2. 
Step 6. To rank the severity of losing each RTU, we propose a straightforward 
metric, which is the time-average of the L2-norm of the difference between the SE 
voltage vector 𝑉𝑆𝐸 ∈ ℂ
𝑁 (where N is the number of buses in a given power system) from 










5.4.4 Simulation Results 
We generated a realistic load profile and added random Gaussian noise to 
synthetic measurements created from the test systems’ power flow results. Based on [19], 
we assumed the line flow, power injection, and voltage magnitude measurement error 
𝜎 = [0.008, 0.01, 0.004]𝑇. For the IEEE 14-bus system, we used a graph partitioner to 
automatically divide the system into 4 substations and assign the appropriate 
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measurements to each substation RTU [33]. For the larger and more realistic Illinois 200-
bus system, we used the existing substation assignments. We assumed every 
measurement (real and reactive line flows, real and reactive bus injections, and bus 
voltage magnitudes) is available to the state estimator when the system is in normal 
operation. When an RTU is simulated as being under attack, the measurements for that 
RTU are removed from the set of measurements that serve as the input to the state 
estimator. We chose a typical convergence tolerance  of 10e-4. 
IEEE 14-Bus Test System 
The IEEE 14-bus test system contains 14 buses, 20 branches, 5 generators, and 11 
loads. We assume there are 4 RTUs. The cyber-physical one-line diagram for the system 
is shown in Figure 41. We assume RTU 1 collects measurements for buses 9, 10, 13, 14; 
RTU 2 for buses 5, 6, 11, and 12; RTU 3 for buses 1, 2, and 3; RTU 4 for buses 4, 7, and 
8. This assignment is shown in Table 7. The simulation considers 30 timesteps. The load 
profile is randomly generated and changes from t = 0 to t = 30. The system operates 
normally from t = 0 to t = 4. From t = 5 until t = 24, a simulated attack is performed on 
each RTU. The normalized load and attack profiles are illustrated in Figure 42. 
 
Table 7. RTU Assignment for IEEE 14-Bus System 
RTU # Bus # 
1 9, 10, 13, 14 
2 5, 6, 11, 12 
3 1, 2, 3 
4 4, 7, 8 
 
When the system is operating normally (no attack), bus 1 is the system slack, and 
OA shows that all buses belong to the same observable island (as shown in Figure 43), 
i.e. the entire system is observable. The measurement graph for this scenario is shown in 
Figure 44. The solid blue lines indicate that all measurements are available. Bus 1 is the 
slack bus for the entire system and is highlighted in green. When an RTU is under attack, 
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the system is no longer fully observable (shown in Figure 45). Through our analysis 
process, we can identify which RTU loss has the biggest impact on the state estimator. 
For example, if RTU 1 is under attack (see Figure 46a), the measurements associated 
with buses 9, 10, 13, and 14 become unavailable (illustrated using dashed lines). Bus 1 is 
the global slack bus (illustrated as a green dot). When the measurements are lost, the 
system splits into two observable islands. One island contains buses 1-13, and bus 14 is 
its own island (illustrated as a black square) since there is not enough measurement 
information to deduce its behavior. 
 
 
Figure 41. Cyber-physical one-line diagram for IEEE 14-bus test system 
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Figure 44. Measurement graph for normal operations 
 
 
Figure 45. Observable island groupings for a DoS attack on: (a) RTU 1; (b) RTU 2; (c) RTU 
3; (d) RTU 4 – black indicates unavailable measurements 
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If RTU 2 is under attack (see Figure 46b), measurements for buses 5, 6, 11, and 
12 are unavailable. The system splits into three observable islands: bus 6, bus 12, and the 
remaining buses. Note that the global slack bus in this scenario is reassigned from bus 1 
to bus 8. Because bus 1 is connected to bus 5 whose measurements are unavailable 
(illustrated using a black dot), the Gain matrix is ill-conditioned, and the solution error 
becomes large if bus 1 was selected as the slack. This issue can be avoided if the slack 
bus is reassigned to the bus furthest away from the unobservable region, bus 8. 
If RTU 3 is under attack (see Figure 46c), measurements from buses 1, 2, and 3 
are unavailable. Even though RTU 3 has only 3 buses, it has the largest negative impact, 
because its loss creates 4 observable islands and 3 unobservable buses. Once again, the 
global slack bus needs to be reassigned, since bus 1 is associated with RTU 3. Bus 8 is 
selected again since it is one of the furthest buses from the unobservable region. 
However, even after the slack reassignment, the Gain matrix is singular, so the solution 
error is very large. 
If RTU 4 is under attack (see Figure 46d), the measurements for buses 4, 7, and 8 
are unavailable, creating two observable islands: bus 8 and the remaining buses. Because 
bus 1 is far from the region with unavailable measurements, the slack bus does not need 
to be reassigned.  
Figure 47 shows a plot of the voltage angle solution errors for five different 
scenarios: normal operation and the respective loss of RTU 1, RTU 2, RTU 3, and RTU 
4. Figure 48 shows a plot of the voltage magnitude errors for those same five scenarios. 
Based on the results, it is clear that an attack on RTU 3 would have the most severe 
impact on solution accuracy. In particular, note the voltage magnitude error. At t = 20, 
the average magnitude error spikes almost as high as 800, which is not feasible 




Figure 46. Measurement graph for attacks on: (a) RTU 1; (b) RTU 2; (c) RTU 3; (d) RTU 4 
  
 
Figure 47. L2-norm of voltage angle errors for normal scenario versus an attack on RTU 1, 




Figure 48. L2-norm of voltage magnitude errors for normal scenario versus RTU attack 
scenarios – (a) decimal scale; (b) logarithmic scale 
 
When we do a closer inspection of the results for t = 20 in Figure 49, we see that 
the absolute value of the voltage angle and magnitude errors for each bus would be on the 
order of 10−3 if there was no attack. However, the L2-norm of the voltage angle error 
can be as high as 1.7057 at t = 12, and the L2-norm of the voltage magnitude error can 
be as high as 7203.23 at t = 20 for bus 1 when RTU 3 is under a simulated attack. The 
state estimator solution becomes meaningless since too many buses are unobservable. 
 
Figure 49. Voltage angle and magnitude error for normal scenario at t = 20 
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From Figure 50, we can see that the large voltage angle errors at t = 20 
correspond to the buses that are unobservable. For a simulated attack on RTU 3, bus 1 
has the largest angle error, followed by buses 2 and 3. Similarly, the large voltage 
magnitude errors also correspond to the unobservable buses (see Figure 51). Bus 3 has 
the largest voltage magnitude error, followed by bus 1 and bus 2. Table I ranks the 4 
RTUs from the most severe to least severe loss. With its avg‖𝑉𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓‖2
 being several 
orders of magnitude larger than that of the other RTUs, we can see the loss of RTU 3 has 
the biggest impact on the state estimator. Note that although RTU 3 is not the RTU with 
the most number of buses (it has three instead of four like RTU 1 and RTU 2), it is still 
the most critical one.  
 
Figure 50. SE voltage angle error for an attack at t = 20 on: (a) RTU 1; (b) RTU 2; (c) RTU 
3; (d) RTU 4 
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Figure 51. SE voltage magnitude error for an attack at t = 20 on: (a) RTU 1; (b) RTU 2; (c) 
RTU 3; (d) RTU 4 
 















1 3 3 4 0.94731 762.555 762.841 
2 1 4 2 0.23922 0.02926 0.24390 
3 4 3 2 0.19784 0.09034 0.22523 
4 2 4 3 0.03052 0.17607 0.17864 
Normal - - 1 0.00251 0.00318 0.00412 
 
 
Illinois 200-Bus Test System [107] 
 
The Illinois 200-bus test system has 200 buses, 246 branches, 49 generators, 160 
loads, and 111 substations. There are 2 substations with 8 buses, 1 substation with 7 
buses, 1 with 6 buses, 3 with 5 buses, 4 with 4 buses, 8 with 3 buses, and the remaining 
substations with 2 or fewer buses. Using the methodology described in Section 5.4.3, we 
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perform an assessment of all 111 substation RTUs. We show select results in Fig. 9 and 
Fig. 10 for the 8 worst scenarios as well as the results for the loss of RTU 34, which is 
one of the two largest RTUs, and the loss of RTU 102, which has the slack bus. Fig. 9 
shows the L2-norm of the SE voltage angle errors, and Fig. 10 shows the L2-norm of the 
SE voltage magnitude errors over the course of the simulation horizon.  
Table 9 shows a ranked list of select RTUs. It includes the avg‖𝑉𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓‖2
 metric as 
well as the time-average L2-norm of only the angle error, which ranged as high as 
0.47693, and the time-average L2-norm of only the voltage error, which ranged as high 
as 0.08619. Note that once again losing the largest RTU does not necessarily cause the 
most severe impact. For example, RTU 34 has 8 buses, but it is only ranked 13th while 
RTU 15 with 3 buses is ranked 5th. Empirically the avg‖𝑉𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓‖2
 metric seems to depend 
on the system topology and RTU assignment, so it is important to run an offline 
systematic assessment on each power system to identify the most critical RTUs. Also, the 
effect of losing a single RTU impacts large systems less than small systems. 
  















1 88 8 8 0.47693 0.08619 0.49159 
2 23 6 6 0.30681 0.08904 0.32511 
3 8 5 5 0.25693 0.03415 0.26128 
4 44 4 4 0.22517 0.06256 0.23740 
5 15 3 3 0.22326 0.02622 0.22662 
6 13 3 3 0.22287 0.01724 0.22458 
7 108 3 3 0.16059 0.05091 0.17104 
8 10 2 2 0.16315 0.03538 0.16955 
13 34 8 8 0.08549 0.10607 0.16529 
23 102 3 2 0.09611 0.04071 0.10616 




Figure 52. L2-norm of SE voltage angle errors for normal operations and select scenarios 
from the Illinois 200-bus system 
 
Figure 53. L2-norm of SE voltage magnitude errors for normal operations and select 
scenarios from the Illinois 200-bus system 
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5.4.5 Conclusions 
In this paper, we proposed a novel methodology for N-1 RTU cyber-physical 
security assessment that systematically studies the impact of losing an RTU on the state 
estimator and a metric for ranking the severity of RTU loss. This approach could be used 
by power system operators to identify the most vulnerable RTUs. We tested our approach 
on two synthetic systems. Empirically we observed that losing the RTU with the most 
number of buses does not necessarily have the most severe impact, demonstrating the 
need for a systematic assessment approach. For future work, this approach could be 
generalized to the loss of multiple RTUs and to assess the impact of the number of 
critical measurements on the errors.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The work from this dissertation addressed two challenges for the state estimator 
of the future: 1) more data to process than ever before and 2) the growing threat of cyber-
attacks. To address the first issue, we used automatic graph partitioning to enable a 
scalable decomposition-based state estimation approach. Empirical results suggest that 
decomposition reduces computation time, except for very small cases. This implies that 
any SE problem should be decomposed beyond its physical boundaries. With the speed 
gains, decomposition-based SE could be used to process a greater number of 
measurements than is currently tractable for central SE. 
To address the second issue, we created a co-simulator that can simulate the 
combined effects of the electrical network and the communication network. By studying 
the cyber-physical system as a whole rather than as separate entities, we can see how 
attacks on one part of the system impacts the rest of the grid. We used the co-simulator to 
study the impact of bad command injection attacks on the power grid. In order to validate 
whether a command is malicious or not, we need information from the physical system as 
well as from the intrusion detection system. Also, we created a novel 3D visualization 
that can show how a power system event or cyber-attack evolves over time. 3D 
visualizations allow power system operators to see time-evolving trends in a single 
snapshot instead of needing to rely on animations. Finally, we presented a new cyber-
physical security assessment methodology that evaluates the impact of network 
availability attacks on RTUs. We showed that losing even a single RTU can cause 
network observability issues. We also showed that the RTU with the most number of 
measurements is not necessarily the most critical RTU to lose. 
6.1 Summary of Contributions 
The contributions of the work in this dissertation are as follows: 
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1. Decentralized state estimation using automatic graph partitioning and ADMM 
a. Introduced automatic graph partitioning as a systematic method for virtually 
dividing a power system into an arbitrary number of sub-areas. 
b. Proposed a fast decomposition-based SE approach, an enhancement to 
traditional WLS SE, which uses the partitioning results to automatically 
decompose the global SE problem into smaller sub-problems and solve them 
in unison using ADMM. 
c. Explored empirically the impact of the number of sub-problems on the 
computational speed of the global SE problem for a serial implementation, 
and extrapolated the speedup seen for the considered IEEE test cases to larger 
power systems. 
2. Cyber-physical security assessment for the smart grid 
a. Presented a co-simulator environment that is capable of simultaneously 
simulating the electrical network and the communication network of a given 
power system. 
b. Used the co-simulator to evaluate the impact of malicious commands on the 
smart grid. 
c. Proposed a metric for evaluating whether a command is malicious or not. 
3. 3D spatiotemporal stacking visualization 
a. Presented a novel 3D stacking visualization as an alternative to the animation-
style visualizations currently used in commercial power system analysis tools. 
b. Allows the power system operator to simultaneously view the power system 
one-line diagram while seeing time-varying behavior in the system. 
c. Provides the ability to hide irrelevant data, which prevents the power system 
operator from being overloaded with too much information. 
4. N-1 RTU cyber-physical security assessment using state estimation 
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a. Proposed a novel methodology for N-1 RTU cyber-physical security 
assessment that systematically studies the impact of losing an RTU on the 
state estimator. 
b. Proposed a metric for ranking the severity of RTU loss. 
c. Observed that losing even a single RTU can cause network unobservability 
issues. 
d. Observed that losing the RTU with the most number of measurements does 
not necessarily have the most severe impact, demonstrating the need for a 
systematic assessment approach. 
6.2 Publications 
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Computing, 2018 (accepted). 
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2018. 
3. N. Saxena, V. Chukwuka, L. Xiong, and S. Grijalva, “CPSA: A cyber-physical 
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Cyber-Physical Systems Security & Privacy (CPS-SPC), Dallas, TX, 2017. 
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